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Abstract 
 
Political polarization is a defining feature of the contemporary American political 
landscape. While there is little doubt that elite polarization levels have risen dramatically 
in recent decades, there is some debate over the existence of a corresponding rise in mass 
polarization.  Recent scholarship on mass polarization has cited evidence related to 
citizens’ positions on public policy issues, party sorting, and geographic polarization; 
however, questions remain as to the nature and extent of mass polarization in online 
spaces.  Specifically, more needs to be known regarding how expressions of elite 
polarization influence the formation of polarized communities within social media. 
 
This dissertation examines the question: Does elite polarization contribute to mass 
polarization in social media?  This question is approached in three stages.  First, this 
dissertation tests whether or not a causal link between elite and mass polarization 
strengthens with temporal proximity to highly politicized and potentially polarizing 
events over the span of the 2016 Republican presidential primary.  Second, this 
dissertation examines the instant effects of elite polarization by examining a minute-by-
minute live stream of reactions on Twitter during the first 2016 presidential debate.  
Third, this dissertation tests a contemporary theory which claims a presidential 
candidate’s patterns of speech sows the seeds of mass polarization in the form of 
resentment, fear, or incivility.   
 
This dissertation also employs the use of network analysis tools to measure the extent to 
which polarized communities form on social media in response to elite cues.  The nature 
of such causal relationships provides insight into the influence polarizing messages by 
elites may have on mass polarization while taking into consideration the unique 
characteristics of the social media communications environment.  In doing so, this 
dissertation offers a blueprint for future researchers who seek to better understand how 
networked technologies shape human interactions. 
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“When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the system usually ends up in a 
really good place.” – Mark Zuckerberg 
 
“Social media … is a veritable battleground, where insults fly from the human quiver, 
damaging lives, destroying self-esteem and a person's sense of self-worth.” – Anthony 
Carmona 
 
“I don’t know a twitter from a tweeter but I know it’s important.” – Hillary Clinton 
 
“I love Twitter.... it's like owning your own newspaper--- without the losses.” – Donald 
Trump 
 
 The 2016 presidential race was considered by many to be one of the most 
divisive, uncivil, and polarizing political races in recent American history.  According to 
recent polling by Zogby Analytics, 68% of Americans viewed the contest between 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as being “extremely or very uncivil” (PR Newswire, 
2016).  This represented a more than three-fold increase over Americans’ views 
regarding the “extremely or very uncivil” nature of prior presidential contests between 
Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in 2012 (20%), Barack Obama and John McCain in 
2008 (18%), and George W. Bush and John Kerry in 2004 (15%).  An open animosity 
between candidates and their campaigns was evident on the campaign trail, in political 
advertisements, during debates, and in television reporting.  In turn, this behavior 
produced a super-charged political environment ripe with examples of elite polarization.  
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Such conditions provided an excellent opportunity to study what effects, if any, elite 
polarization has on mass polarization. 
 The phenomenon of rising elite polarization has also been accompanied by a 
concurrent rise in the use of social media as a vehicle for political communication.  One 
particularly popular social media platform for this type of communication has been 
Twitter, which allows users to instantly share thoughts, opinions, and reactions via words, 
images, and HTML links.  One of the most valuable aspects of Twitter is that it provides 
an immediate snapshot of a person’s state of mind; reactions to external stimuli can be 
measured in near real-time.  Just as the conditions of the 2016 presidential race provided 
an excellent opportunity to study possible links between elite polarization and mass 
polarization, the emergence of social media as a popular form of political discussion 
provides an extremely valuable tool for measuring such possible links.   
 This dissertation examines the question: “Does elite polarization contribute to 
mass polarization in social media?”  Such a question is not only important for better 
understanding the dynamics of political polarization, but it is especially timely given the 
convergence of increases in political incivility and the rise of social media as a political 
platform.  The bulk of prior literature on political polarization has studied the 
phenomenon through the lens of the traditional media environment, while using methods 
appropriate for such settings.  However, this dissertation argues that the social media 
environment is vastly different than the traditional media environment, most notably with 
respect to the structural dynamics of social media that redefine what it means to be a 
political elite.  As such, this dissertation utilizes a mixed methods approach including 
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social network analysis and visualization in order to better understand how members of 
social networks react to polarizing behavior on the part of elites. 
One major benefit of studying social networks is that it allows researchers to 
examine how interpersonal relationships and social neighborhoods form in response to 
“real world” events.  Prior research on causal links between elite and mass polarization 
has primarily relied upon evidence citing individuals’ positions on public policy issues 
and party sorting (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009; Levendusky 2009; 
Abramowitz 2013).  While these are definitely useful measures, any ostensible effects are 
often separated from their purported causes by a considerable amount of time.  This time 
lag allows for a significant muddying of the waters, as individuals have increasingly more 
opportunities to be influenced by multiple intervening variables as the time horizon 
between cause and effect increases.  Perhaps even more importantly, such measures of a 
causal relationship largely rely upon self-reporting and proxies, which are prone to 
subjectivity, reporting error, and imperfect comparisons.  
I approach the main research question of this dissertation in three stages.  First, I 
use daily measurements to test whether there is a relationship between rates of affective 
rhetoric and the temporal proximity to major political events over a one-year time span.  
Second, I use minute-by-minute measurements to test for similar relationships over the 
100-minute span of a presidential debate. Third, I test a contemporary theory which 
claims a presidential candidate’s patterns of speech sows the seeds of mass polarization 
in the form of resentment, fear, or incivility.  In all three cases, I employ cutting-edge 
network analysis and visualization tools to measure the extent to which any such rises in 
affective rhetoric are successful in gaining influence in their respective networks.   
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The following overview summarizes how the following chapters pursue the 
question regarding the effects of elite polarization on mass polarization in social media: 
 
Chapter Two: Theoretical Model and Literature Review 
 Communication technology made significant advancements during 1990’s, as the 
Internet and the World Wide Web made it possible for people across the globe to access 
news and information instantly, while also gaining the ability to share information with 
others.  The rapid advancement of social media technology during the first decade of the 
21st Century made it possible for people to share information in ways that were 
previously unimaginable.  Further, these shifts allowed the common citizen to 
communicate in ways that could potentially rival the influence and reach of traditional 
mainstream media outlets.   
 These seismic shifts in communication technology represent a paradigmatic shift 
which require a rethinking of traditional political communications theory – especially 
with respect to the extent elite cues play in establishing possible causal links between 
elite polarization and mass polarization.  Further, more needs to be known regarding how 
the social media environment modifies the impact and reach of affective rhetoric, as well 
as how such language contributes to the formation of polarized communities.  Chapter 
Two presents a theoretical model for examining such causal links while, presents a 
review of the relevant communications literature, and outlines the chronological 
development of social network analysis as a methodological discipline. 
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Chapter Three: Data and Methods 
 A primary goal of social network analysis is to better understand how members in 
a network share information, gain influence, and create communities of discussion.  As 
Chapter Two argues, achieving this goal requires a rethinking of existing 
communications theory and the use of a new set of methodological tools.  However, 
many of these tools employ concepts and analyses that are foreign to the traditional study 
of political science.  As such, Chapter Three provides an overview and explanation of the 
specific methods used in this dissertation. 
 
Chapter Four: Social Network Patterns of Affective Rhetoric during the 2016 Republican 
Primaries 
 Chapter Four presents the first of three sequential empirical studies designed to 
test the main research question of the dissertation.  The first empirical chapter draws 
upon an original data set of 366 daily observations collected over a one-year period 
during the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary comprised of roughly 8.4 million tweets 
containing approximately 160,000,000 words.  This chapter uses a broad time frame for 
examining whether political events cause an increase in mass affective rhetoric, while 
also seeking evidence regarding the impact extreme affective rhetoric has on the 
architectural structure of networks. 
 
Chapter Five: The Instant Effects of Confrontation, Controversy, and Contempt: A live-
stream analysis of mass polarization on Twitter during the 2016 presidential debates 
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 Whereas Chapter Four examines the dissertation’s main research question from a 
broad temporal perspective, Chapter Five examines the same question with a far higher 
level of temporal detail.  Drawing upon a second unique data set of approximately 
1,500,000 tweets captured live and categorized into one-minute intervals during the first 
2016 U.S. presidential debate, this chapter seeks to measure the immediate reactions by 
individuals when they are exposed to potentially polarizing elite cues.  Few studies have 
sought to analyze causal relationships between elite cues and mass affective rhetoric with 
the level of detail which is pursued in Chapter Five.  The findings presented in this 
chapter suggest compelling evidence that such reactions are often extreme and have an 
immediate impact on the formation of polarized communities. 
 
Chapter Six: Mountains or Molehills? Examining the “Trump Effect” on Twitter 
 The third and final empirical chapter applies the theory and methods developed in 
this dissertation to test a prevailing argument forwarded by media and political elites 
during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: the existence of a “Trump Effect”.  
Specifically, this argument posited that the language and actions of Donald Trump during 
the presidential election caused feelings of fear and anxiety among several segments of 
U.S. society, while simultaneously encouraging anger and aggression in others.  The 
possible existence of such an effect raised important questions regarding how presidential 
candidates’ patterns of speech may influence feelings of resentment, fear, or incivility.  
However, such a purported effect has not received a level of rigorous scientific inquiry 
befitting of its ostensibly serious implications.   
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Chapter Six seeks to help fill this void by analyzing the effects of Donald 
Trump’s most controversial remarks during the U.S. presidential election on social 
networks.  This chapter draws upon an original data set of approximately 4,500,000 
tweets consisting of nearly 86,000,000 words collected over the span of 548 consecutive 
days from 9/1/2015 through 3/1/2017.  Findings in this chapter suggest that while there 
was evidence of a causal relationship between controversial remarks by Donald Trump 
and a resulting rise in anxiety, fear, and aggression, similar effects were found when 
examining remarks made by his opponent, Hillary Clinton. 
 
Chapter Seven: Future Research, Implications, and Conclusions 
 The final chapter reviews the findings presented in this dissertation while 
discussing how these findings better inform our understanding of the relationship 
between elite and mass polarization, the implications for the study of political 
communication in the social media era, and the ways in which future research can expand 
and refine the findings presented in this dissertation.  Further, I discuss the wider societal 
implications of this dissertation with respect to prevailing utopian and dystopian 
perspectives regarding social media and the Internet, while placing the research into 
context with emerging networked technologies. 
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Dissertation Chapter 2 
Theoretical Model and Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eric C. Vorst 
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Introduction 
In this dissertation, I expand upon existing theories regarding the relationship 
between elite polarization and mass polarization in order to answer the question: Does 
elite polarization contribute to mass polarization in social media?  I propose that a 
completely different approach is required when testing for potential causal relationships 
in the social media environment than the approach used when testing for potential causal 
relationships in the traditional media environment.  Such a different approach is 
necessary because of fundamental differences between the two communications 
environments.  These differences are discussed in greater detail within this chapter and 
following chapters.   
The hypotheses presented in the empirical chapters of this dissertation are based 
upon the following theoretical model: 
 
This theoretical model proposes that potentially polarizing cues originate from 
elites and enter the communications environment.  When the mass public is exposed to 
these cues, there is a likelihood of increases in mass affective rhetoric which, in turn, 
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could contribute to increases in affective polarization.  Due to the unique nature of the 
social media environment, the mass public is able to re-enter the communications 
environment to express polarized cues of their own – not unlike the cues originating from 
elites.  In theory, this process reinforces an increasingly polarized communications 
environment that creates spaces where mass political polarization can develop.  In other 
words, social media allows for affective rhetoric to not only spread efficiently among the 
mass public, but to be amplified by members of the mass public as well.  Further, it 
allows for individual communities of ideological homogeneity to form with far greater 
ease than was previously possible in the traditional media environment.  
The vast majority of prior research on elite cues, political polarization, and media 
effects have been conducted within the context of the traditional media environment.  It is 
critical to acknowledge the unique nature of the social media communications 
environment, how it differs from the traditional communications environment, and why 
this matters when testing this theoretical model.  Given the completely different structure 
of the social media communication environment, it is possible that the influence and 
reach of elite cues disseminated through social media sources will be different than the 
same elite cues would be in traditional media sources.  As such, the existing literature is 
in need of revisiting and, in some cases, revisions.   
One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to illustrate how and why 
traditional approaches to political communication analysis may not be the best fit for 
studying political communication in social media.  To build this case, I first draw upon 
literature addressing three predominant forms of polarization: elite, mass, and affective, 
while also discussing the role played by incivility.  Second, I discuss elite cues, self 
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selection, and how these variables react differently within the traditional and social media 
communication environments.  Last, I provide support for network analysis as a robust 
means for testing these relationships by presenting a chronological overview of the 
development of social network analysis as a reliable and effective methodology within 
the social sciences. 
 
Political Polarization 
Elite Polarization and Mass Polarization 
Political polarization is a defining feature of the contemporary American political 
landscape.  By most measures, polarization amongst political elites has reached record 
levels (Heatherington 2009).  A primary tool for measuring polarization among elites is 
DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation), originally 
developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal in the early 1980s.  This tool utilizes 
roll-call vote records by members of Congress as a means for estimating their position on 
the liberal/conservative ideological continuum.  After multiple iterations over multiple 
congressional sessions, trends have emerged over time which demonstrate a clear 
ideological divergence in voting behavior among political elites.  In short, Republicans 
are voting in a more exclusively conservative manner, Democrats are voting in a more 
exclusively liberal manner.  More importantly, there has been progressively less overlap 
in the moderate areas of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. 
Recent research suggests polarization in Congress has become so pronounced that 
congresspersons sharing district borders, yet representing different parties, consistently 
vote in opposition to each other – even when congresspersons share heavily 
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gerrymandered borders where one would expect some geographical common interests 
(Andris 2015).  These phenomena are indicative of the widening levels of polarization 
amongst American leaders and are widely considered to influence our political system in 
a way that causes more harm than good.  For example, an increasingly polarized U.S. 
Congress faces more scenarios where compromise is difficult to achieve, leading to 
gridlock and – in some cases – threats of a government shut down (Farina 2015).   
The extent to which polarization manifests itself in the American electorate is still 
an open question.  Fiorina has provided strong support for the argument that most voters 
have not been influenced by increased levels of polarization amongst elites (2011).  At 
the same time, polarization can be observed through increased levels “sorting”, wherein 
voters’ party identification and ideological self-placement are increasingly aligned 
(Levendusky 2009).  Polarization is also evidenced by a tendency of supporters of one 
party to follow to demonize supporters of the opposing party (Abramowitz 2013).  
Further, there is evidence to suggest mass polarization is fueled by deep-seated 
psychological impulses of “fear and loathing” of members in the opposing political party, 
especially amongst those who are in the “out party” (Kimball, et al. 2014). 
Recent national polls support the conclusion that the American public is 
increasingly divided along party lines and, more importantly, separated by an increasing 
gap of partisan identification.  The Pew Research Center (2014) found the percentage of 
Democrats who were consistently more liberal than the median Republican rose from 
70% to 94% from 1994 to 2014.  Similarly, the percentage of Republicans who were 
consistently more conservative than the median Democrat rose from 64% to 92%.  
During the same time span, the levels of antipathy towards members of the other political 
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party more than doubled, with the percentage of Democrats viewing Republicans very 
unfavorably rising from 16% to 38% and the percentage of Republicans viewing 
Democrats very unfavorably rising from 17% to 43%. 
Just as levels of elite polarization can be measured by observing behavior on the 
part of political elites such as voting records or other elite cues, levels of mass affective 
polarization can be measured by observing variances in mass affective rhetoric.  
Questions remain as to whether or not high levels of affective polarization translate into 
high levels of mass political polarization.  However, it is reasonable to believe that such a 
relationship could exist, as an atmosphere filled with strong psychological divisions could 
be primed for divisions along other lines, given the proper elite cues are delivered.   
Such a possibility appears more likely when one considers the possibility that 
expressions of political polarization in the form of elite cues may have a kind of framing 
effect on the mass public, wherein expressions of political polarization by elites 
influences and shapes the mass public’s understanding of political reality.  Broadly 
defined, political framing occurs when a story or issue is portrayed using a specific 
perspective or through a particular lens.  Despite being presented with the same set of 
facts, a person may reach different conclusions depending upon the way an issue is 
framed.  Framing has the potential to be a powerful persuasive tool, as it occurs in a 
manner that is far less obvious than the traditional means of outlining an argument based 
upon clearly stated premises and conclusions.   
If viewed from a framing theory perspective (Blumer 2015), the framing potential 
of elite cues would equate to elites affecting not only polarized behavior on the part of the 
mass public (or, “what to think about”) but also potentially affecting polarized political 
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positions on the part of the mass public (or, “what to think about it”).  Given the 
influence of political figures’ ideological differences on affective mass polarization 
(Rogowski and Sutherland 2015), such a causal link is not out of the question.  In 
attempting to answer questions regarding the extent and effects of mass polarization on 
political participation, the vast majority of research has been conducted through the lens 
of traditional forms of communication, such as mass media messages, candidates’ 
campaigning tactics, or voting behavior of elected officials.  
 
Affective Rhetoric, Incivility, and Affective Polarization 
 An increasing body of literature has defined mass polarization in terms of affect.  
While related to the concept of emotion, affect is best defined as emotion that persuades.  
When applied to political polarization, this school of thought argues that rather than being 
driven by political ideology, political divisions in the mass public are driven by hostility 
towards the opposing party.  Instead of a person with one party identification opposing 
someone with a different party identification based upon ideological differences or policy 
disagreements, such hostility is the product of psychological mechanisms.  Drawing upon 
a definition of affect as emotional persuasion, it can be viewed as a type of argument that 
is less cerebral and more base.   
When such persuasion is married to party identification and infused within 
political debate, the results can be detrimental to reasoned discussion.  Such partisan 
discrimination fuels levels of affective polarization that can, in some cases, be equally as 
strong as levels of polarization based on race (Iyengar and Westwood 2015).  These 
 22 
tendencies are troubling, especially given what social scientists know about the myriad 
divisions rooted in race related issues. 
 Another potentially troubling manifestation of affective rhetoric is embodied 
through incivility.  In broad terms, incivility can be defined as “rude or impolite attitude 
or behavior” (Merriam-Webster 2017).  Incivility is of particular interest to political 
scientists, given its potential for eroding democratic norms, trust in institutions, and a 
healthy political discourse.  If the media, presidents, and congresspersons are seen as 
progressively mean and nasty, this could diminish citizens’ perceptions of media and 
political elites’ ability to reach reasoned, rational, and dispassionate conclusions about 
how government should operate.  Further, citizens who are averse to (or simply tired of) 
constant disagreements, bickering, and nastiness may simply turn away from political 
discussion and choose less stressful pastimes. 
It is no surprise that the political communication literature is ripe with empirical 
studies of incivility’s potentially negative effects on the political process.  For example, 
incivility depicted on television during political debates has been found to create a 
corresponding distrust of government (Mutz and Reeves 2005).  Evidence exists of a 
negative relationship between discursive incivility and deliberative attitudes such as 
open-mindedness and favorable assessments of opposing viewpoints (Hwang 2008).  
Further evidence suggests that exposure to increased levels of incivility leads to 
decreased political trust and political efficacy (Borah 2013), while even more evidence 
points to a demobilizing effect on voters exposed to increased levels of incivility (Wolf, 
Strachan, and Shea 2012).  Such research represents but a few examples; however, it is 
consistent with a wider literature detailing the potential negative effects of incivility.   
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At the same time, there is some evidence that the negative consequences of 
incivility are not as extreme as others may fear.  Brooks and Geer (2007) found that 
despite uncivil attacks by political elites being viewed by the public as less fair or less 
informative, such behavior did not lead to detrimental effects among the public.  Others 
have argued that incivility itself is too broadly defined, and that researchers should 
instead be measuring more pronounced forms of uncivil behavior, such as expressions of 
outrage (Sobieraj and Berry 2011).   Regardless of the degree to which incivility has a 
negative impact, it must be stressed that the bulk of these studies have been conducted 
within the context of the traditional media environment – a context which is markedly 
different than the social media environment.   
If it is true that affective rhetoric in the form of incivility has potentially 
deleterious effects within the traditional media communication environment, it is 
reasonable to conclude that similar effects may occur within the social media 
communication environment.  The main goal of this dissertation is not necessarily to 
confirm or debunk the extent of incivility’s deleterious effects on political discourse.  
Rather, the main goal is to find evidence of how forms of affective rhetoric and incivility 
propagate throughout social networks and, the ways in which such behavior contributes 
to political polarization, and – most importantly – how the nature of these relationships 
differs when viewed within the context of social media.   
Regardless of whether a causal linkage exists that flows from elite polarization, 
through elite cues, affective rhetoric, and affective polarization, and results in mass 
polarization, the political communications literature can be strengthened by better 
understanding how different types of elite cues influence affective polarization in 
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different types of interpersonal environments.  This understanding is especially important 
with respect to how elite cues delivered in a live, confrontational, and politically charged 
atmosphere contribute to affective polarization which, in turn, may be creating conditions 
that may foster mass polarization in online spaces. 
 
Traditional Media as One-Way Streets 
Elite Cues 
It is widely accepted that traditional media has the power to shape political 
discussion.  Much of this power is derived from its role as an agenda setter.  Early 
research in the study of media effects found the media not only influences what people 
think about an issue, but it influences how important people think that issue is.  It was 
further argued that the power to influence issue salience was in fact the primary effect of 
mass media, to such an extent that the power to influence opinion formation was 
negligible (McCombs and Shaw 1972).  However, such perspectives were challenged by 
the demonstration of a causal link between opinion formation and issue salience, built 
upon the premise that “the distinction between ‘what to think’ and ‘what to think about’ 
is misleading” (Entman 1989).  Further, opinion formation likely involves a more 
complicated process than simply being told what is most important.  Rather, opinions are 
formed through a process that combines an individual’s prior beliefs, an issue’s 
alignment with these beliefs, and perceived issue salience (Zaller 1992).  
Given that it is nearly impossible to force someone to adopt a specific position 
that they would have otherwise not taken, the more likely route for engaging in 
successful agenda setting is through selective dissemination of information.  Despite the 
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fact that mass media cannot necessarily make people think a certain way, it can influence 
what people are thinking about.  In turn, opinion formation can be influenced by 
promoting the importance of one issue while suppressing or omitting other potentially 
important issues.   
More recent research indicates that some areas of mass media play a role in 
opinion formation that is not necessarily dependent upon issue salience.  Specifically, 
media bias in editorials has been shown to influence voters’ evaluations of candidates as 
well as the choices voters’ make at the ballot box (Druckman and Parkin 2005).  While it 
is true that media outlets engage in selective dissemination of information (and indicating 
what people should think about) by choosing whether or not to publish an editorial on a 
particular issue, it is also true that the direct impact of an editorial’s persuasive power on 
the merits of an issue can not be ignored.  Rather put, while the power to influence “what 
to think” flows directly from the power to influence “what to think about”, one cannot 
assume that salience alone is sufficient.  Once the importance of an issue is 
communicated, the way in which the issue is presented or argued will have a direct 
impact on the types of opinions that are formed. 
Overt bias in the form of editorials is but one way information consumers can be 
influenced “what to think”.  There is also significant evidence that the ways in which 
news is framed plays a central role in how people form their opinions.  Such evidence 
was presented by Shanto Iyengar (1992), who classified framing as being either thematic 
or episodic.  According to Iyengar, episodic framing presents and discusses issues within 
a narrow or “zoomed in” perspective. Episodic framing often focuses on the immediate 
impact on individuals in society, and can often incorporate a dramatic element.  A 
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popular example of such a news story is of a struggling single mother who must survive 
on welfare.  Because of the episodic frame, viewers or readers of the story are more likely 
to focus on how to help the single mother or other single mothers directly and personally.  
Conversely, thematic framing uses a “zoomed out” perspective, typically focusing on an 
issue’s broader impact, wider themes, or general implications for society.  An example of 
thematic framing in a news story might discuss the issue of welfare from an institutional 
standpoint, the challenges of funding, or the negative stigma society sometimes applies to 
those on welfare.  In contrast to episodic framing, which tends to be more easily 
accessible, thematic framing is often more abstract and, as such, is often more difficult 
for the general population to digest intellectually.   
Ultimately, the types of actions people feel must be taken in response to these 
news stories depends heavily upon whether they are presented in an episodic or thematic 
frame.  For example, an episodic frame may lead a viewer to favor actions that occur at 
the individual level, such as finding ways to directly assist the single mother on welfare.  
Likewise, a thematic frame may lead a viewer to favor actions that occur at the 
institutional level, such as welfare reform or more effective application of need-based 
social resources.  The distinction between episodic and thematic framing matters because 
the majority of televised news is presented in episodic frames.  As a result, information 
consumers are more likely to form opinions that favor an individual-based need agenda 
versus an agenda favoring institutional or systemic modifications.  Such an agenda-
setting power by the media is more subtle than selective information dissemination and 
editorial bias, but it is no less as effective in its end results. 
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Self-selection 
It is widely accepted that traditional media engages in agenda setting and that this 
behavior is a means by which bias can be expressed.  However, the extent to which 
traditional media serves a function as gatekeeper of political information must also be 
acknowledged.  The traditional media’s power as gatekeepers provides it with the 
potential to exert a powerful influence on citizens’ political discussions, including 
content, intensity, and tone.  Traditional media sources decide what information to 
provide, how to frame it, and how frequently to provide it.  Within this structure, 
information consumers have little direct power to influence the content or delivery of the 
information provided by information sources. 
Despite information consumers having little direct power to influence the content 
or delivery of the information provided by information sources, consumers have the 
power to choose from a range of available traditional media information sources.  While 
it is true that information providers may adjust content to meet the perceived expectations 
of their audiences, it is also true that an information provider’s slant will influence the 
composition of its audience (Levendusky 2013).  Such a tendency allows for information 
consumers to “self-select” the information they receive, thus allowing them a modicum 
of autonomy when choosing the manner in which they are exposed to political 
information (Mutz 2006).  Opportunities for self-selection increased as the number of 
television news providers expanded during the shift from network broadcasts to 24/7 
cable news providers in the 1980’s.  Still, the range of information consumers’ choices 
within the traditional media marketplace has been and remains somewhat constrained, 
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while the providers of such information retain a significant amount of discretion 
regarding the type of information provided.   
  
The Changing Landscape of Political Communication: Social Media as a Platform 
Since its widespread adoption in 2009, Twitter has emerged as a major tool for 
sharing political information and for engaging in political debate, all within a 140 
character-per-message limit.  By 2015, 23% of adult Internet users utilized Twitter, up 
from 16% in 2012 (Pew 2015).  The demographic characteristics of Twitter users are also 
important to note.  When measured as a percentage of all Internet users, Twitter users are 
disproportionately young (32% between 18-29), urban (30%), and non-white (28% black, 
non-Hispanic; 28% Hispanic) when compared to the overall demographics of the United 
States (Pew 2015). 
The increased use of social media by politicians is a reflection of the increased 
use of social media by the American public.  In ten short years, the frequency with which 
Americans use social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has increased 
dramatically, rising from 7% in 2005 to 65% in 2015 (Pew 2015).  As recently as 2012, 
34% of Americans used social media to share their thoughts or comments on political and 
social issues.  Social media users on opposite ends of the political spectrum did so even 
more frequently, with 42% of liberal Democrat social media users and 41% of 
conservative Republican social media users utilizing such platforms to engage in political 
discussion (Pew 2012).  The level of engagement on social media did not end with 
merely discussing politics; by the end of 2014, 18% of Republican social media users and 
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15% of Democratic social media users were actively following candidates for office, 
political parties, or elected officials (Pew 2015).  
 One particularly noteworthy aspect of Twitter that sets it apart from social 
networking sites like Facebook is that Twitter allows for a much higher level of 
anonymity in its users.  While Twitter does prohibit users from impersonating someone 
else, it does not prohibit the use of pseudonyms, or “fake names”.  This policy is in stark 
contrast to Facebook’s “real name” policy, which requires people to “provide the name 
they use in real life” so that other users “always know who [they’re] connecting with” 
(Facebook 2016).  These differences between anonymity policies matter, as recent 
research indicates there is a positive correlation between online anonymity and incivility 
when discussing “politically sensitive and potentially divisive issues” (Rowe 2015).   
The type of social media platform also matters, whether it be Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter, or any one of the myriad social network platforms, because different 
rules govern the types of interactions users can engage in.  As such, these rules have a 
direct effect on the types of networked publics that can be shaped within these 
environments (Boyd 2010).  This is important to acknowledge because it means one 
social media platform may foster incivility more readily than another social media 
platform, depending upon the extent to which architectural allowances are made for 
anonymity.  Given the ability for Twitter users to remain anonymous if they choose, it is 
possible that the Twitter environment will be more uncivil than online environments that 
take extensive steps to verify users’ identities.  In turn, one would expect levels of 
observed mass polarization to be more pronounced on Twitter than on Facebook.  If true, 
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this makes Twitter a prime testing ground for the effects of polarizing language on large 
scale social networks. 
Twitter is also useful for studying mass polarization due to its user networks 
being far more flexible and open than user networks on Facebook, due largely to the fact 
that Twitter is a predominantly public network.  With the rare exception of users with 
private accounts, every tweet is publicly visible and available to be viewed by anyone 
who searches for the correct hashtag, user, or key words.  Conversely, Facebook 
networks are largely restricted to those who make an active choice to request – and to be 
accepted into – a user’s circle of friends or into a discussion group.  While it is true that 
content and network analyses can be conducted on Facebook networks, such analyses 
provide a perspective of networks that form after an individual has made the conscious 
decision to enter into a particular discussion community.   
While these differences may seem minor, they have significant implications when 
attempting to observe the link between elite polarization, affective rhetoric, and mass 
polarization.  Part of finding evidence of such a link requires the ability to link elite cues 
to the decision-making process in the mass public, and to do so within a measurable 
temporal perspective.  For example, if a candidate were to make an incredibly offensive 
statement on a Monday, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to measure the effect this 
had on the decision of individuals to join specific Facebook groups on the following 
Tuesday.  It would also be difficult (if not impossible) to analyze the extent to which 
individuals with differing political ideologies on Facebook either intermingled or became 
more polarized.  Granted, one could perform focused content analysis within each 
Facebook group; however, the power of comparison across multiple groups would be 
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nullified.  On the other hand, the fluid and open nature of Twitter networks allows 
researchers to observe causal effects of elite polarization and affective rhetoric as they 
unfold.  More importantly, it allows for researchers to observe how communities form in 
reaction to such elite behavior as they form, rather than studying these communities after 
they have formed.  Again, the differences in Twitter and Facebook networks seem minor 
at first, but they have significant meaning when viewed within the context of this 
dissertation’s main research question. 
 
The Changing Landscape of Political Communication: Social Media and Politics 
Social Media and Networked Publics 
A brief review of fundamental structural changes in the political communication 
environment over the last few decades is helpful in understanding social media’s special 
place in this evolution.  Newspapers and television news programs are primarily one-way 
streets, where journalists have an agenda setting influence through the process of 
gathering and disseminating information (McCombs & Shaw 1972).  While it is true that 
consumers can self-select their sources of information, their power to influence 
information content is limited.   
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The Internet can be both a one-way or two-way street, as it not only allows 
consumers to self-select online sources of information, but it also allows consumers to 
share their opinions in the comment sections typically appearing at the end of an online 
article (Marchionni 2013).  After reading the original author’s article, information 
consumers are then able to read the opinions of other readers.  While these opinions may 
be reviewed by a forum moderator to censor obscene language or hate speech, the content 
often lacks the same level of journalistic integrity that is typically expected of most 
online news sources.  Readers of these comments are thus exposed to sources of 
information that are neither vetted, verified, or anticipated by the online publisher or 
original author.  More importantly, readers – not the author – have power to shape the 
story in ways that were previously impossible prior to the introduction of the Internet as a 
source of news and opinion.  
 
Social media changes the information sharing dynamic completely, as it fosters a 
flexible media environment that is shaped almost entirely by each individual’s choice of 
connections.  Not only can users shape the social media environment they experience, but 
they can also shape the social media environment experienced by others.  This 
phenomenon has given rise to the notion of networked publics, which are defined as 
spaces created by networked technologies where an “imagined collective … emerges as a 
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result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice” (Boyd 2010).  In this 
respect, information consumers have the power to become influential information 
providers.  This new paradigm shatters the traditional hierarchy of news dissemination 
and commentary, allowing active social media participants to become “leaders of opinion 
and creators of noise and buzz” (Sebastião 2014).  
  
Social media’s unique architecture requires analysts to rethink conventional 
wisdom regarding information gatekeepers and agenda setters.  In contrast to the top-
down hierarchical information dissemination process of traditional media sources and the 
capability for bottom-up information dissemination in the form of user comments on 
websites, members of social networks are parts of user generated neighborhoods of 
discussion that are largely the result of an individual centric information dissemination 
network.  Social network users create and expand upon information sharing and 
discussion opportunities through a constantly shifting lattice of the user’s network of 
connected “friends” and, more importantly, the secondary network of those “friends’ 
friends”. 
Considering the significant structural differences between the traditional and 
social media information environments, an examination of mass polarization in social 
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media cannot begin and end with only a consideration of elite cues.  Rather, equal 
consideration must be given to how members of a social network react when exposed to 
polarizing messages, with whom those messages are shared, and the extent to which 
those messages reach influential members in the network.  Doing so provides insight into 
how deeply polarizing language is able to penetrate into discussion within a social 
network at a given point in time.  As a result, it allows for a better glimpse into how 
social media networks facilitate mass polarization differently than traditional sources of 
information sharing.  
 
Self-selection 
The opportunities for members of online social networks to self-select the 
information they receive – as well as the people with whom they share information – are 
exponentially greater than they are in the traditional media environment.  Such control 
over self-selection is especially salient when measuring for a relationship between elite 
polarization and mass polarization in social media environments.   There is little doubt 
that social media has fast become a virtual town square for citizens to discuss politics 
(Kavanaugh, Perez-Quinones, Tedesco, & Sanders, 2010).  As this town square has 
become more populated, it has also created increasing opportunities for citizens to be 
exposed to elite cues – especially from political candidates and elected officials. This is 
due in large part to the fact that the structure of the social media environment and the 
methods individuals use to share information are fundamentally different than other 
forms of media.  
 The ability for information consumers to actively choose the type of information 
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they receive and the providers who supply it, coupled with the ability to actively avoid 
types of information and providers they do not wish to consume, can lead to Internet 
users creating a virtual environment consisting mostly of information they agree with 
(Sunstein 2001).  Also referred to as “filter bubbles” (Pariser 2011), such environments 
have potentially negative consequences, as information consumers are able to craft their 
own information realities which could favor a disproportionately high percentage of 
information with which they agree versus information with which they disagree.  One 
potential downside of such an outcome is that it can lead to ideological homogeneity in 
networks.  People in “filter bubbles” ostensibly experience more comfort in being 
surrounded by those with whom they agree, yet could be argued to be at a disadvantage 
due to being sheltered from attitudes and beliefs that are different than theirs.  Clearly, 
there are potentially negative implications of such outcomes if one considers the benefits 
of ideological diversity.   
 
Elite Cues: Social Media as a Strategic Resource for Political Entrepreneurs 
Just as social media has evolved into an inexpensive and powerful tool for the 
mass public to share political information and engage in political discussion, the same is 
true for political elites.  Politicians have modified their communications strategies to take 
advantage of the medium as a low cost means to reach potential voters and supporters.  
One recent example of how politicians have begun to utilize social media as a low-cost 
and high-impact medium occurred during the 2008 Democratic election.  As Gainous and 
Wagner (2011) observed, Barack Obama’s “Yes We Can” YouTube video was able to 
reach a far larger audience at a far lower cost than a competing televised town hall by 
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Hillary Clinton.  The Obama Campaign seized upon other forms of social media, 
including direct text messaging, in order to reach potential voters with very little 
investment in campaign finances.  Other politicians were quick to note the potential 
benefits and incorporated their own social media strategies.  By 2012, the use of 
YouTube videos was a standard element of most campaign strategies (Gainous and 
Wagner 2014), as was the incorporation of other forms of social media like Facebook and 
Twitter.  This relatively recent and pronounced influx of political elites into the social 
media environment cannot be underestimated, as it has most assuredly resulted in an 
atmosphere that not only contains more elite cues, but also likely contains increased 
expressions of elite polarization.  
Political elites’ use of social media as a strategic tool for gaining advantages over 
their opponents often extends beyond the act of communicating policy objectives, 
attempting to sway potential voters, or striving to turn out the vote.  It can also be used to 
employ more negative strategies such as those employing fear appeal (Borah 2014) or 
personal attacks.  In this respect, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have been especially 
active on Twitter during the 2016 presidential election.  Using the Twitter API to collect 
the 3,200 most recent tweets sent by Clinton and Trump as of 10/21/2016, it was found 
that Trump’s official Twitter account averaged 12.1 tweets per day since 2/1/2016 and 
Clinton’s official Twitter account averaged 24.8 tweets per day since 6/14/2016.  The 
accusations leveled within these official tweets ran the gamut, including – but certainly 
not limited to – verbatim candidate depictions of their opponents as being dangerous, 
risky, terrifying, clueless, crooked, corrupt, hateful, shameful, bullies, bigots, whiners, 
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and, of course, liars (Twitter 2016).  Such an environment provides rich testing grounds 
for examining the effect elite polarization may have on mass polarization in social media.   
 
Conclusions 
There is a great deal of existing scholarship examining the extent to which elite 
and mass polarization is linked; however, the vast majority of this literature examines 
such a relationship within the scope of traditional communications environments.  Within 
this chapter, I have presented an argument for why researchers must take into account the 
paradigmatic differences between traditional communication environments and the social 
media environment.  Not only does the study of social networks require a different 
contextual perspective on the part of the researcher, but it also requires a unique set of 
tools.  In Chapter Three, I outline the reasons why these differences matter when 
questioning whether or not elite polarization contributes to mass polarization in social 
media and why social network analysis is an effective method for answering this 
question.  Chapter Three also presents a brief history of the methodological development 
of social network analysis, while describing the processes used to gather data and the 
specific social network analysis tests employed when testing various aspects of the main 
research question in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. 
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Introduction 
 The main research question of this dissertation asks whether or not elite 
polarization contributes to mass polarization in social media.  As noted in Chapter 1, this 
question is pursued through the investigation of three related and more specific questions, 
using three individual mixed-methods empirical studies and three unique data sets to 
investigate the main research question from three different perspectives. 
It is important to note that most large n Twitter studies have focused upon single 
conglomerate networks comprised of an aggregation of messages collected over the span 
of multiple days, weeks, or months of observations.  To be sure, such studies are breaking 
ground with respect to our understanding of how mass polarization manifests itself in 
social media.  While these sorts of data projects have allowed for unique research 
questions to be tested rigorously, little has been done in the area of performing extended 
time-series sentiment analysis.  Specifically, no known works have attempted to use large 
scale network analysis methods over an extended period of time by using individual daily 
observations as a means for examining how changes in the real-time political climate 
influence levels of political polarization in social media networks. 
Measuring the frequency of affective rhetoric in social networks is an important 
first step in understanding the role such language may play in fostering political 
polarization.  However, measurements of frequency alone do not tell the full story of how 
negative messages impact participants of social networks, where connections between 
individuals vary widely depending upon their immediate personal networks as well as the 
personal networks of those with whom they are connected.  Answering questions such as 
these will shed more light on how social networks react and respond to affective rhetoric, 
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as well as how this informs our understanding of the relationship between elite and mass 
polarization. 
With social media, it is less a question of how many times a message is sent; it is 
more a question of how deeply that message spreads throughout the network and how 
long that message is able to sustain itself.  These are defining features of the social media 
environment which represent a paradigmatic shift compared to the traditional media 
environment.  Understanding these differences is a critical part of answering this 
dissertation’s question regarding the extent to which elite polarization influences mass 
polarization in social media.  Social network analysis allows for the identification of 
trends in reactions by the mass public in response to elite cues.  More importantly, it 
allows for an examination of how effectively the mass public’s reactions are disseminated 
throughout the communications network.  In lay terms, this dissertation probes the 
question, “If civility falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it really fall?” 
Chapter Three begins with a brief chronological overview of the development of 
network analysis methodology in the social sciences.  After establishing this context, I 
provide a summary of the data sets used in this dissertation, along with how they were 
collected and how they were applied to test the hypotheses presented in Chapters Four, 
Five, and Six.  Additionally, this chapter discusses the different methods used to test each 
hypothesis, including content analysis and network analysis.  
 
Chronological Overview of Network Analysis Methodology 
Methodological Foundations of Network Analysis: The Pioneers 
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 The roots of social network analysis can be traced back to J. L. Moreno’s 
development of the concept of “sociometry” (1934), which describes social systems as 
“attraction-repulsion-neutrality systems” that form as a product of human preferences.  
Moreno argues that such human preferential systems do not lend themselves well to 
traditional statistical and observational methods that rely heavily upon “objective fact 
finding”.  Instead, an approach to examining social systems requires a “process of 
subjectification” when observing interactions between members of these systems 
(Moreno 1934, p 56).   
Derived from the field of linguistics, subjectification accounts for contextual 
meanings as well as inherent meanings.  Such an approach not only accounts for the 
preferences of one person, but it accounts for how those preferences relate to the 
preferences of others within the same system.  Simply put, preferences within an 
interactive communications system must be viewed subjectively because they are 
dependent on the preferences of others in the system while, at the same time, influencing 
the preferences of others.  This is directly relevant to analyzing online social networks, 
given the nature of networked publics outlined previously in this chapter. 
The process of subjectification is at the heart of network visualization and is 
primarily expressed through the use of sociogram charts, which provide a physical 
representation of individual members of a group during a discrete period of time.  It 
should be stressed that this picture can change if the temporal period of observation 
grows shorter or longer, as the individuals participating in the group may decrease or 
increase during different time spans.  For example, if a researcher employed the use of 
sociograms to analyze the social network structure of students in a high school cafeteria, 
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he or she would almost assuredly find different results in a sociogram constructed during 
breakfast and one constructed during lunch, just as he or she would find different results 
in sociograms constructed during lunch periods on a Monday versus a Friday.  
Sociograms are especially useful when examining networks of social interactions 
due to their flexibility in observational scope.  Researchers can examine social 
interactions on a wide range of scales and across a wide range of time frames.  Further, 
sociograms allow researchers the ability to survey the structure of an entire social system, 
identify communities of interest, and examine these communities with greater detail.  
Placing this process into the context of modern social network analysis, researchers can 
identify tightly clustered groups of discussion, “zoom in” on these groups to identify 
individual users, then pull out relevant characteristics of these users to answer more 
deterministic questions such as prevailing ideological leanings, frequency in 
communication, or participation in other social systems – to name a few. 
Moreno’s sociograms provide the basis upon which modern social network 
visualization is built.  It must be stressed that social network analysis is largely non-
deterministic; social network visualizations cannot be read in the same way as one reads a 
traditional Cartesian graph.  In other words, one cannot isolate an individual within a 
sociogram and reach immediate conclusions based upon the size or “X/Y” grid location 
of that individual.  Instead, the size and location of the individual within a sociogram 
must be interpreted in relation to other individuals within the sociogram.  In contrast to 
the deterministic nature of traditional graphs, social network analysis is based upon 
relationships and, more importantly, the power of strong, interconnected, and influential 
relationships within a defined system.   
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Social Network Analysis Renaissance 
Few major developments occurred within the study of social networks for several 
decades following Moreno’s initial work.  Some of the more notable contributions 
included research by Lévi-Strauss (1951) on rules governing kinship systems and work 
by Haray (1959) in the area of sociometric matrices analysis.  Despite these significant 
steps forward in the mathematical foundations of social network analysis, the field went 
largely ignored by the social sciences.  Perhaps the most impactful scholarship to 
originate from the 1950’s school of social network analysis came from communications 
studies pioneer Everett Rogers’s Diffusion of Innovation (1962), in which Rogers 
expanded upon concepts initially presented in Moreno’s original 1934 work.  
 
The Modern Era of Social Network Analysis 
Despite these early advancements, there is a relative scarcity in volume of 
academic literature on social network analysis prior to 1990.  As Bernard observes, “20 
articles about social network analysis [are] listed in Sociological Abstracts” between the 
years 1960 and 1975.  Conversely, “from 1990 to 2005, the number [is] over 3,000” 
(2005).  Clearly, social network analysis gained traction within numerous areas of social 
research.  Given the geometrically multiplying increases in computing power during the 
1990’s and through the 21st Century, it is likely that this sudden surge in academic study 
was largely facilitated by the availability of inexpensive and powerful computers capable 
of putting mathematical theory into practical action. 
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More recent work has been successful in clearly defining social network analysis 
as an organized paradigm.  A prime example of such literature is found in Linton 
Freeman’s Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science 
(2004), in which Freeman defines social network analysis as consisting of four features.  
First, social network analysis does not focus on the attributes of actors, but rather upon 
the connections between actors.  Second, social network analysis is built upon systematic 
data collection that focuses upon these ties.  Third, social network analysis is strongly 
reliant upon the use of graphical representations.  Last, social network analysis is 
dependent upon mathematical and computational tools to “make sense of the welter of 
information” that describes these ties (Freeman 2004, p 3).  Modern social network 
analysts employ these techniques as a means for identifying trends in structural 
patterning; the structure of a network tells researchers a great deal about the patterns of 
speech, discussion, and relationships.   
The emergence of social media – and of Twitter in particular – has provided a 
wealth of new opportunities to utilize social network analysis tools as a means for 
studying human behavior.  Social network analysis goes far beyond the ability to produce 
“eye candy” in the form of striking and often beautiful visualizations.  Social network 
analysis draws upon empirical data to provide context for relationships between 
individuals and, in doing so, reveals insight into issue trends, influential participants, and 
a treasure map for learning more about their predominant characteristics.  In this respect, 
social network is a powerful tool for organizing massive amounts of empirical data and 
allowing the analyst to identify and focus upon empirical data that is most germane to his 
or her research question.  Today, social network analysis is an invaluable tool for making 
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sense of the millions of interactions that occur on an hourly basis across multiple social 
network platforms. 
Increasing numbers of researchers have enjoyed improved access to powerful 
social network analysis tools in recent years, due largely to the convergence of social 
media’s widespread popularity with researchers’ access to progressively powerful 
computers at reasonable costs.  Such a convergence allows social network analysts in the 
“Twitter Age” to design research frameworks capable of sufficiently accommodating 
Freeman’s four features of social network analysis.  Twitter data provides information on 
the connections between actors and an application program interface (API) that allows for 
systematic collection of this data, while modern personal computers have the ability to 
process complex algorithms and convert them into graphical representations of social 
networks containing tens of thousands of actors.  Additionally, powerful software is 
readily available that allows these graphics to be presented in a manner that clearly 
illustrates where neighborhoods of discussion form in relation to each other.  
Despite the availability of such tools, academic contributions in the field of social 
network analysis have been sparse until recently.  As Williams, Terras, and Warwick 
(2013) observed, only three academic papers published in 2007 focused upon Twitter in 
some form or another.  This number rose to eight in 2008 and 36 in 2009, with the 
volume of academic research increasing significantly in the 2010’s.  It is likely that these 
increases was due to a combination of several factors.  First, the 2010’s saw a boon in the 
availability of progressively powerful and increasingly inexpensive hand-held mobile 
smart devices which were ideal for using a lightweight and easy-to-use application like 
Twitter.  Second, researchers enjoyed a concurrent rise in computing power alongside a 
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corresponding drop in cost.  Third, third-party software developers began releasing 
numerous inexpensive open-source tools allowing researchers to access the Twitter API 
at little to no cost to the researcher.   
As social network analysis has gained more acceptance within academia, 
researchers have begun to focus on the issue of political polarization in social media.  
Early examples include studies examining the extent to which Twitter users cross 
ideological lines (Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith 2013) and challenge conventional 
wisdom with respect to media echo chambers (Barberá et al. 2015).  These studies have 
represented valuable efforts to examine and quantify the nature of mass polarization and 
filter bubbles in social media.  There are also increasing numbers of studies drawing upon 
large n datasets spanning several months worth of Twitter messages, many of which are 
designed to better understand how political information is shared and discussed within 
social media networks as a whole (Gruzd 2014; Morales 2015).   
 
Instant Effects during High Stakes Political Events 
This dissertation examines the relationship between elite polarization and mass 
polarization in social media through different temporal lenses.  Chapters Four and Six test 
this question using very broad time horizons, measuring shifts in daily sentiment over the 
span of hundreds of days.  However, Chapter Five tests this question using a 
comparatively small time horizon, measuring shifts in minute-by-minute sentiment over 
the span of a 100-minute presidential debate.  Without a doubt, there is value in 
identifying shifts in sentiment over broad time horizons, as this offers to reveal trends 
with staying power.  If a particular sentiment predominates for multiple days, it could 
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indicate a high level of salience.  At the same time, broad time horizons are limited when 
it comes to measuring the mass public’s reaction to specific types of elite cues.  When 
measuring daily shifts in sentiment, the researcher must make a best guess as to the 
primary independent causal variable, given that a great deal of information is 
disseminated throughout a single day within the 24/7 news cycle.   
Conversely, when measuring minute-by-minute shifts in sentiment, the researcher 
is equipped with far higher resolution when it comes to identifying the causal 
independent variables.  Recent research in the field of political communication has 
focused on the phenomenon of hybrid media events, wherein social media is used 
alongside and during televised political events.  Referred to as “dual screening”, the 
viewing public expands its role from being a mostly passive consumer of information to 
being an active member of the political event itself.  These roles often involve members 
of the general public using social media to engage in “lay tutelage” behavior, including 
the acts of fact-checking, correcting, counter-claiming, or highlighting biased reporting 
(Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’Loughlin 2015).  Within this environment, the power of event 
participants to shape the narrative increases in proportion to their relative influence when 
measured by their number of active followers.  In such a scenario, these event 
participants may serve as “bridging elites” with an influential power that can rival that of 
media and political elites (Freelon & Karpf 2015). 
Other recent research has examined ways in which collective patterns of behavior 
on social media during media events differ from behaviors observed in traditional media 
contexts.  One such example with particular relevance to this dissertation found a 
multitude of notable behavioral characteristics among individuals who engage in “dual 
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screening” during media events (Lin et al. 2014).  Specifically, individuals who engaged 
in social media communication during televised political events exhibited significantly 
lower levels of interpersonal communication.  There was also a tendency for individuals 
to exhibit a higher level of concentrated attention to topics, while also engaging in far 
more “re-tweeting” and replying.  Most significantly, Lin et al. found that elites tended to 
be the predominant beneficiary of these sorts of behaviors. 
Findings such as these have been extremely valuable in better describing and 
explaining the roles individuals play in politically charged social media environments, as 
well as the types of individuals who play these roles.  At the same time, more needs to be 
known regarding how elite messages originating in the traditional media environment 
shapes the network structures that facilitate social media participants’ roles, whether they 
be participating in a bridging elite, lay tutelage, or passive observer function.  
Specifically, a better understanding of the nature of how these network structures shift 
can provide valuable context for interpreting the relative influence of participants 
regardless of their roles.  
 
Data Collection 
This dissertation draws upon an original data set created by accessing the Twitter 
API via the NodeXL Excel template (Social Media Research Foundation, 2017) on a 
daily basis from September 1st, 2015, through February 1, 2017.  The full data set used in 
the three empirical chapters of this dissertation consists of approximately 13,000,000 
tweets and 260,000,000 words.  This data is part of a larger daily collection regimen 
which (at the time of this writing) conducts searches for nearly 40 unique names, 
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hashtags, or Twitter accounts, allowing for the curation of approximately 250,000 tweets 
per day.  While other options exist for conducting Twitter API searches, NodeXL was 
chosen due to its ability to perform a wide range of search functions while keeping the 
financial costs to the researcher extremely low.   
A primary limitation of using the Twitter API for data collection is that the results 
returned for high-frequency search terms represent a sample of approximately 1% all 
tweets during the specified search time frame.  According to Twitter, these results are “a 
statistically relevant sample”.  Such a rather vague explanation is somewhat bedeviling to 
social scientists, as it limits the ability to establish the extent to which this ostensibly 
“random” data is representative of the larger population.   
Recent research indicates that data acquired via the Twitter API may not be very 
random after all.  For example, when comparing data sets compiled through multiple 
Twitter API searches, Joseph et al. (2014) found that on average, more than 96% of 
tweets found in one sample were also found in all other samples.  Despite such 
similarities, the content found in the subset of non-matching samples did not differ 
significantly in terms of tweet structure or user popularity.  It should be stressed that such 
limitations apply to any scientific study using high volumes of data acquired via the 
Twitter API.   
Given that Twitter operates as a publicly-traded for-profit business, it is likely that 
Twitter has a financial motivation for not allowing potential business competitors to have 
insight into the nature of their randomization models, or any other type of proprietary 
algorithms or code.  It is also worth noting that use of the Twitter API seems to be the 
preferred method for social media researchers, as the only option for avoiding Twitter’s 
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black box of “statistically relevant samples” is to pay for access to the Twitter “firehose” 
or to purchase data from companies specializing in storing hundreds of billions of 
archived historical tweets.  Such access allows researchers access to every single tweet 
ever sent, typically acquired by purchasing a given volume of tweets (e.g. 100,000) 
mentioning a give key term (e.g. “Donald Trump”) over a given time frame (e.g. 
11/1/2016 – 11/31/2016).  While such an option provides researchers with the ability to 
fine-tune the creation of their data sets without needing to perform daily searches, it is 
also an option that is often prohibitively expensive.   
In sum, while there are limitations with respect to how representative the Twitter 
API’s “random” data is of the larger population, these limitations are shared by most 
researchers in the social sciences.  Rather than being a condition that disqualifies the 
validity or generalizability of results obtained through Twitter API data, it is more of a 
caveat to be considered when analyzing the results of any study using such data.   
 
 
 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a valuable method for quantifying the frequency of words in 
bodies of text.  Typically, content analysis utilizes specialized dictionaries which 
organize words within specific categories.  Through this process, various meanings and 
themes within the text begin to emerge.  Content analysis is used in this dissertation in 
two main ways.  First, I use content analysis to measure positive and negative sentiment.  
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Second, content analysis is used to measure the frequency of words expressing specific 
types of reactions, including emotional and higher-level thought processes. 
The primary tool for conducting content analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software 
application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill 
University.  This software was used in conjunction with the Lexicoder Semantic 
Dictionary (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2016) and the Regressive Imagery Dictionary 
(Martindale 1975, 1990).  The Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary draws upon a dictionary of 
approximately 5,000 words and is designed to measure the positive and negative 
sentiment in political texts.  The Regressive Imagery Dictionary is comprised of 
approximately 3,000 words divided into three primary categories with 44 sub-categories.  
These categories are divided into Primary Processes, which include drive, sensation, 
defensive symbolization, regressive cognition, and Icarian imagery; Secondary Processes, 
which include abstraction, social behavior, instrumental behavior, restraint, order, 
temporal references, and moral imperative; and Emotions, which include positive affect, 
anxiety, sadness, affection, aggression, expressive behavior, and glory.  The 
aforementioned categories are used in this dissertation to provide a more accurate 
measurement of affective rhetoric.  Measuring specific types of thoughts and emotions 
(such as abstraction and aggression) provides an element of specificity that is more 
precise than mere positive and negative sentiment. 
Content analysis is performed by processing text obtained via daily NodeXL 
searches of the Twitter API through Lexicoder 3.0.  The initial results provided by 
Lexicoder 3.0 are in the form of raw frequency counts.  However, given fluctuations in 
total volume of total tweets observed on individual days, the use of basic frequency 
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counts lacks descriptive accuracy.  Rather put, a measurement of 100 occurrences of 
positive words on a day with 10,000 total words is substantively different than a 
measurement of 100 occurrences of positive words on a day with 20,000 total words.  
Hence, an essential step in content analysis involved converting raw frequency counts 
into rates by dividing them into the total number of words tweeted during each day of 
observation.  In order to improve the comparative utility of these rates, they are reported 
as “rate of anxiety per 1,000 words”, “rate of aggression per 1,000 words”, and “rate of 
negativity per 1,000 words”. 
 
Time-series Analysis 
 Measuring temporal relationships between actions by political elites and reactions 
by the mass public is a central part of testing the main research question of this 
dissertation.  Social media provides an excellent environment for testing whether or not a 
relationship exists between elite and mass polarization because of its ability for the mass 
public to express their instant reactions to comments made by political elites.  Time-
series analyses were a natural choice for such tests, especially given the rich and 
extensive data sets that were collected during the composition of this dissertation.  Time 
series analysis is especially useful for examining trends, as well as for identifying 
potential cause and effect relationships.  If it is true that certain types of elite cues elicit 
polarizing types of behavior in the mass public, evidence of such relationship will 
become evident if repetitive patterns emerge through time-series analysis.  
 Time series analysis is used in this dissertation to measure for shifts in sentiment 
and affective rhetoric in several ways.  In Chapter 4, I use time-series analysis at the 
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macro level, by drawing upon 366 daily observations spanning 7 different candidates 
over a full calendar to test for cause-and-effect relationships between proximity to a 
presidential primary election or debate and a resulting rise in mass affective rhetoric.  In 
Chapter 5, I use time-series analysis at the micro level by analyzing each individual 
minute of tweets captured live during the first presidential debate.   
In Chapter 6, I use time-series analysis to test for the existence of the proposed 
“Trump Effect”, which argues that controversial remarks by Donald Trump during the 
primary and general elections were encouraging aggressive behavior in some Americans 
while creating fear and anxiety among others.  Time-series analysis is performed by 
measuring specific reactions in the mass public to especially controversial remarks made 
by a high profile political elite: Donald Trump.  In sum, time-series analysis can be a 
valuable tool for testing temporal relationships between multiple variables.  This 
dissertation takes advantage of the methodological flexibility of time-series analyses to 
measure such relationships within the scope of a variety of unique political scenarios. 
  
Network Analysis 
 The empirical studies presented in subsequent chapters make extensive use of 
network metrics and network visualizations created with Gephi 0.8.2 for Macintosh, 
which an open source and multiplatform application especially designed for creating 
visual graphs of any type of network.  It must be stressed that social network analysis is 
primarily about relationships between people and groups.  These relationships are 
observable through the use of both descriptive network metrics and visualizations.  
Network analysis is especially useful for answering questions about mass political 
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behavior in social network environments because it allows researchers to observe 
relationships in a way that is not feasible through traditional means such as survey data or 
regression models.   
 
Network Visualization 
Gephi is an especially useful tool for testing the hypotheses posed in this 
dissertation because it allows for a comparison in networks between days with high rates 
of polarizing language and days with low rates of polarizing language.  Such differences 
are manifested either by graphs demonstrating clusters of mostly unconnected discussion 
on the fringes of the network map or graphs demonstrating a high concentration of 
interconnected nodes near the center of the network.  In this respect, daily variances in 
network architecture serve as dependent variables, while the rates of polarizing language 
serve as the independent variables.  If it is true that polarizing behavior on the part of 
elites causes polarizing behavior in the mass public, such tendencies can be observed in 
the shape and structure of groups within these networks, as well as through an 
examination of shifts in network metrics. 
Social network analysis allows researchers to identify links between the types of 
discussion occurring within social networks and the resulting neighborhoods they form.  
This is an especially important aspect to keep in mind when interpreting network 
visualization graphs.  A cursory understanding of how Gephi accomplishes this is 
important for making the most sense of the network visualization portion of the 
dissertation. 
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 First, a specially formatted data file is imported into Gephi.  The very least the 
software requires is a “node” (or the sender, receiver, or re-tweeter of a message) and an 
“edge” (or the connection between two nodes), to which Gephi assigns what can best be 
described as magnetic values to the nodes and edges.  In simplest terms, nodes repel each 
other while edges draw nodes together.  This repulsion is especially strong where 
individual nodes with no edges are concerned.  The net result (after many hundreds of 
algorithmic iterations) is that as the number of nodes and edges in a network increase, the 
forces of attraction and repulsion create a picture of areas in the network where the web 
of communication is most dense.  As a result, nodes that are more interconnected with 
other nodes form “neighborhoods” of discussion and, in doing so, create a stronger 
gravitational force that repels smaller “neighborhoods” of nodes.   
These neighborhoods are of special interest because they define areas where 
people are gathering in virtual spaces.  Since the data sets for this dissertation are built 
around specific search terms (e.g. “Donald Trump” or “Hillary Clinton”), these 
neighborhoods illustrate where people are gathering to discuss a particular candidate.  
More importantly, it can bee seen whether communication is predominantly occurring 
between influential members of the network, or whether it is more widely dispersed 
amongst less influential members of the network.  An explanation of the network metrics 
used to estimate influence is outlined in the following subsection.  
 Network analysis – when combined with content analysis – provides a picture of 
both the nature of political discussion and the efficiency with which this discussion 
spread throughout members in the network.  For example, if content analysis on a 
specific date demonstrates a relatively high rate of aggressive affective rhetoric, but 
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network analysis suggests a weakly connected network, one could infer that the impact of 
such rhetoric has been mitigated.  Conversely, if content analysis alone was used in this 
scenario, the more likely inference would have been an overestimation of the aggressive 
rhetoric’s overall impact on members in the network as a whole.  Simply put, content 
analysis provides valuable aggregate measures – but network analysis puts these 
aggregate measures into context by taking into account the critical variable of network 
structure. 
 
Network Metrics 
While there are a wide range of methods available for testing various 
characteristics of networks, this dissertation focuses primarily upon metrics describing 
the frequency, centrality, and influence of members in a given network.  Of these three 
measures, centrality and influence are especially critical to this dissertation’s research 
question, as they provide additional information that goes beyond the aggregate measure 
of frequency.  Frequency is most easily defined as the volume of messages originating 
from or being directed to an individual member of the network.  Centrality is measured 
by using network visualization to observe an individual’s relative location within the 
wider network, using the methods described in the previous subsection.  Influence is 
measured by calculating the influence of an individual within a network based upon the 
influence of the people he or she is connected with.   
These measures matter in the social media communication environment because 
frequency is not the same as influence – nor is it the same as centrality.  These 
differences are important because Individual A may have a large number of immediate 
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connections, but if those connections are not influential, Individual A’s relative influence 
in the network is limited.  Conversely, Individual B may have a small number of 
immediate connections who are very influential and, in such a scenario, Individual B 
would likely have far more influence in the network than would Individual A.  
Acknowledging and testing for these differences is a critical aspect of this dissertation 
because it accounts for network dynamics that enhance or diminish the frequency of a 
message.  A message may appear relatively frequently, but if it is not shared with 
influential or central members in a network, the impact of the message will be 
diminished. 
The primary network metrics used in this dissertation to test influence and 
centrality are Average Community Size and Average Path Length.  Average Community 
Size provides an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are in 
the network.  This metric is calculated by first running a modularity algorithm.  Generally 
speaking, modularity is a measure of a network’s tendency to gravitate towards clusters 
of communities.  High modularity values suggest the existence of more sophisticated 
internal structures and, in turn, help describe how a network is compartmentalized into 
sub-networks (Blondel et al. 2008).  Accounting for modularity matters because it 
provides concrete values when looking for evidence of mass polarization.  Networks with 
high average community sizes indicate a tendency of individuals in a particular network 
to cluster together around certain topics, themes, or pieces of information and, in turn, are 
consistent with polarized behavior. 
Average path length provides an indication of a network’s efficiency by providing 
a measure of how easily messages can travel throughout a given network.  It is best 
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understood as a measurement of the number of steps it takes for a message to travel 
across a network (Brandes 2001; Albert and Barabási 2002; Newman 2003).  
Specifically, a message originating from one member (node) in a network and 
terminating with another member (node) in a network represents a path length of one.  A 
message originating from one member (node) in a network, being received by a second 
member (node) in a network, and being sent to a third member (node) in a network 
represents a path length of two.  It should be noted that in this second example, the path 
length is still two even if the intermediary member (node) sends this message to multiple 
other members before the message reaches its terminus. 
In order to establish context for average path length values, I report these values 
as a percentage of network diameter.  In brief, network diameter is defined as the longest 
path distance between any two members (nodes) in a network.  As such, it provides one 
estimation of the network’s overall size.  Since network diameter varies from graph to 
graph, so too does the relative value of the average path length.  For example, members 
of a network with an average path length of 3 and a diameter of 3 are far more 
interconnected than members of a network with the same average path length of 3 but 
with a diameter of 6.  Such a measure is particularly useful to investigating this 
dissertation’s research questions because it helps identify networks which are conducive 
to homophily.  Specifically, networks with low average path length to network diameter 
ratios indicate the likelihood of smaller and potentially polarized clustering of network 
members.  As is the case with each of the network metrics used in this dissertation, this 
measure is best used in conjunction with other network metrics.  It is unlikely that a 
single network metric can best describe network structure on its own.  Rather, the most 
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accurate assessment of a network’s dynamics is best attained by accounting for multiple 
characteristics.  
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation relies heavily upon a mixed-methods approach combining large 
scale data collection, extensive content analysis of hundreds of millions of words across 
nearly two years of daily observations, and creative application of cutting edge network 
visualization tools.  While time-series analyses are extremely useful in measuring for 
trends or cause-and-effect relationships, network analysis helps to put any such findings 
into context.  Analyzing social networks requires special attention to be given towards 
relationships and, more importantly, how the strength of relationships modify the 
influence and centrality of messages being sent and received.  This purpose of this brief 
chapter has been to familiarize the reader with the methods used for analyzing these 
relationships in order to maximize their descriptive power in addressing the main 
research question of this dissertation.  Each of the following empirical chapters employs 
network analysis methods in a slightly different way to provide three unique perspectives 
on the relationship between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media. 
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Introduction 
 In this first empirical chapter, I test the theory that as a political event draws 
nearer, there will be an increase in the general combativeness among those who discuss 
politics.  This is similar to a “big game” effect, where people argue about sports near the 
Super Bowl or World Series.  The 2016 Republican primary provided an excellent testing 
ground for this chapter, as the primary featured an initial field of 19 viable candidates.  
The unpredictable and often volatile nature of the primary field was magnified by the 
candidacy of businessman Donald Trump.  
This chapter first tests the proposition that the use of affective rhetoric in social 
networks is positively correlated with its temporal proximity to a political event.  
Additional tests are performed to determine if a political figure’s ranking in national polls 
increases the quantity of affective rhetoric.  This first set of tests are designed to answer 
the first half of a two-part question that recurs in subsequent chapters: “Does it happen?” 
Second, this chapter tests how social networks react to increases in affective 
rhetoric.  As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is ample evidence demonstrating the 
nature and structure of the social media communication environment is significantly 
different than the nature and structure of traditional communication environments.  While 
prior studies have examined the effects of affective rhetoric in traditional environments, 
very few have done so within the unique communications environment of social media.  
In brief, the second set of tests within this chapter were designed to measure the extent to 
which increases in affective rhetoric in the aggregate impacted the reach and influence of 
such rhetoric.  This second set of tests were designed to answer the second half of a two-
part question that recurs in subsequent chapters: “Does it matter?” 
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Research Questions 
In order to test for a link between the proximity to a political event and a 
subsequent rise in social network polarization, this chapter investigates two sequentially 
dependent research questions.  Specifically, the first research question looks for a causal 
link between politically-charged events in the “real world” and rises in affective rhetoric 
on social media, while the second research question measures how the unique nature of 
social networks impact the extent to which any such effects matter. 
 
Research Question  #1: 
Does the proximity to a political event result in an increase in affective rhetoric in 
social media? 
 
Research Question #2: 
Do participants in open social networks tend to self-police especially 
controversial forms of affective rhetoric? 
 
Hypotheses 
  
Hypothesis #1: The use of polarizing language in social networks is positively 
correlated with its temporal proximity to a political event. 
Hypothesis #2: Online social networks tend to sequester unproductive messages 
in favor of constructive debate. 
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Data and Methodology 
Data Collection: NodeXL 
Data for this chapter was gathered by using NodeXL to perform a search for each 
of the top three GOP presidential candidates over the span of 366 consecutive days 
during the primary election season.  The full data collection consisted of 1,047 individual 
data sets, with a total number of observations tallying roughly 8.4 million tweets 
consisting of approximately 160,000,000 words.   
The data returned from these searches was comprised only of messages sent 
roughly within the preceding 24 hours, so it was essential to engage in these searches 
every single day over the seven month span of the data gathering process.  These searches 
were often hampered by idiosyncrasies of the NodeXL data collection process, including 
unpredictable search interruptions due to shifting Twitter volumes.  For example, in some 
cases searches would be cut short due to the NodeXL API shifting into a “summary” 
mode to account for extremely high volumes of Twitter data at that given time, while in 
other cases simple fluctuations in Internet connectivity could trigger the software to end 
collection.  Further, Twitter sets a limit to how many free requests for data can be made 
during a set period of time, which was a cause for frequent concern.  However, due to an 
unyielding tenacity in data collection, the vast majority of daily observations ranged from 
between 5,000 and 25,000 tweets. 
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Candidate Search Terms 
The selected search terms focused on the candidates’ full names (e.g. “Donald 
Trump” or “Jeb Bush”) rather than their Twitter tags (e.g. “@realDonaldTrump” or 
“@JebBush”) in order to filter out tweets that were coming directly from the candidate 
themselves.  Actual candidate tweets have been collected separately using a search term 
that only gathered messages being sent from their official Twitter account.  This approach 
allowed me to approach the data from an alternate perspective.  First, it allowed me to 
focus only on people who were talking about the candidates, rather than including 
messages from the candidates themselves.  Second, it placed the focus on the semantic 
content of the tweet rather than the “tagging” process.  Rather put, I wanted to look at 
how people talked about these candidates when using their names in a sentence that was 
not necessarily “tagged” with the candidate’s Twitter name (e.g. @realDonaldTrump).  
Another way to view the difference is to describe it as looking at how people talk about 
someone, rather than how they talk to someone. 
Admittedly, the process of examining how people talk about someone (e.g. 
“Donald Trump”) versus how people talk at someone (e.g. “@realDonaldTrump”) is not 
entirely in line with conventional approaches to studying Twitter communication.  After 
all, the foundation of personal identity on Twitter lies in the ampersand tag; Donald 
Trump’s personal identity on Twitter is “@realDonaldTrump”, not “Donald Trump”.  
Further, the vast majority of studies on Twitter communication focus on users’ 
ampersand tags as the point of reference.  However, the field of social network analysis is 
one that invites researchers to approach questions from alternative perspectives.  There 
are few known formal studies on how people communicate differently on Twitter when 
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talking about someone versus talking at someone.  This dissertation will offer a first step 
in this line of inquiry, thus opening up opportunities for future research. 
 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis was performed to determine the total number of positive and 
negative words within the individual data set for each candidate on each day of 
observation.  Positive and negative words were chosen as a proxy for affective language, 
which can be an indicator of polarization (Iyengar 2012).  The primary tool for 
conducting the content analysis was Lexicoder 2.0, a Java-based software application 
developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill University.  This 
software was used in conjunction with the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, which is 
designed to capture the sentiment of political texts.  The Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary 
does so by assigning a positive or neutral value to a defined set of over 3,500 words.  
After text is processed through Lexicoder 2.0 and the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, a 
raw count of total positive and negative words per tweet was produced.  These counts 
were collected, compiled, and recorded for each of the candidates’ daily data sets.  In 
order to make these numbers more usable, they have been reported as “positive words per 
1,000 words” or “negative words per 1,000 words”.1 
While positive and negative words have the potential to highlight affective 
language, mere positive and negative language alone cannot account for some of the most 
polarizing types of language.  As such, I selected for analysis one of the most profane 
words in the English language: the “F Word” (or “F*ck”).  It should be noted that the 
                                                
1 See Chapter 2 
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different incarnations of this word are not always necessarily negative in tone.  Indeed, 
this word is often used to express joy, happiness, confusion, excitement, or any number 
of emotions that are not expressly negative.  However, this word represents the epitome 
of vulgarity and profanity and, as such, serves as a valuable proxy for analyzing affective 
rhetoric, regardless of the tone with which it is used. 
A basic Excel “find and replace” function was used to gather a raw count of how 
often any variation of the “F Word” appeared in each of the 105 individual days of 
observation across all three candidates.  A wildcard symbol was used at the end of the “F 
Word” in order to capture as many variations of the word as possible, such as “F*cks”, 
“F*cker”, “F*cking”, “What the f*ck”, and so on.   
 
Methods 
Time Series Analysis 
Hypothesis #1 and the first half of Hypothesis #2 were tested using a battery of 
time-series analyses measuring the rise and fall of affective and uncivil language in 
proximity to a political event.  The dependent variables measured include the rate of 
affective language and the rate of extremely uncivil language.  The independent variables 
are represented by the days during which a primary debate or primary election occurred.  
I record the estimated viewership of each debate and the delegates at stake on each 
primary election date in order to place its political importance in context.  The logic 
behind this decision is that debates with higher viewership and primary elections with 
more delegates at stake are likewise more important political events.  If there is a positive 
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relationship between political events and mass polarization, we should see a spike in the 
use of uncivil or affective language on these dates. 
Given the wide time frame of daily observations gathered over a full year, it was 
necessary to identify time frames within the primaries.  Simply put, it is difficult to create 
a timeline that is easily interpreted when observing 366 data points in time.  In order to 
best present the time-series data, I divided the primary season into three individual stages.  
One unintended benefit of this approach is that it allowed me to isolate and compare three 
different phases of the primary season, each of which featured distinctly different levels 
of competitiveness. 
The first phase was called the “Cattle Call Stage” (9/1/2015 – 1/31/2016) and was 
a period during which there were six different candidates who occupied a top three spot 
in the Real Clear Politics polling average at any given time.  The “Cattle Call Stage” 
featured six televised debates, but there were zero primary election dates.  The second 
phase was called the “Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016) and was a period which 
tracked four candidates who reached a top three spot in the Real Clear Politics polling 
average.  The “Competitive Stage” featured five televised debates and eleven primary 
election dates.  The third and final phase was called the “Confirmation Stage” (4/1/2016 
– 6/30/2016) and was a period during which the same three candidates consistently rested 
in the top three spots of the Real Clear Politics polling average.  There were zero 
televised debates during the “Confirmation Stage”; however, there were nine primary 
election dates. 
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Network Analysis 
 The second half of Hypothesis #2 was tested using Gephi for Mac, which is an 
open source and multiplatform application especially designed for creating visual graphs 
of any type of network.2  It is worth stressing again that social network analysis is 
primarily about relationships between people and groups.  Social network analysis allows 
for the identification of links between the types of discussion occurring within social 
networks and the resulting neighborhoods they form.  This is an especially important 
aspect to keep in mind when interpreting network visualization graphs, as their 
interpretive power lies in comparative relationships rather than in absolute Cartesian 
values.   
Gephi is an especially useful tool for testing Hypothesis #2 because it allows for a 
comparison in networks between days with high rates of affective rhetoric and days with 
low rates of affective rhetoric.  Such differences are manifested either by graphs 
demonstrating clusters of mostly unconnected discussion on the fringes of the network 
map or graphs demonstrating a high concentration of interconnected nodes near the 
center of the network.  In this respect, daily variances in network architecture serve as 
dependent variables, while the rates of polarizing language serve as the independent 
variables.  Additionally, Gephi is an extremely useful tool for isolating specific types of 
language and identifying the areas of networks where such language occurs.  Network 
visualization graphs are also used to test Hypothesis #2 by analyzing the extent to which 
members of Twitter networks using extreme forms of affective rhetoric are successful in 
gaining visibility and influence for their messages. 
                                                
2 See Chapter 3 
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Results and Analysis 
Hypothesis #1: The use of polarizing language in social networks is positively correlated 
with its temporal proximity to a political event. 
 
When testing Hypothesis #1, results suggested that there is a moderate and 
positive relationship between rates of affective language usage on a given day and its 
proximity to a political event.  During the “Cattle Call Stage” (9/1/2015 – 1/31/2016), 
positive and negative word usage rate increased following 5 of 6 debates (83%), while “F 
Word” usage rate increased slightly during 3 of 6 debates (50%).  During the 
“Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016), positive and negative word usage rate 
increased either on or immediately following 7 of 11 primary election dates (64%) and 3 
of 5 debates (60%), while “F Word” usage rate increased either on or immediately 
following 8 of 11 primary election dates (73%) and 5 of 5 debates (100%).  During the 
“Confirmation Stage” (4/1/2016 – 6/30/2016), positive & negative word usage rate 
increased either on or immediately following 6 of 9 primary election dates (67%), while 
“F Word” usage rate increased either on or immediately following 7 of 9 primary election 
dates (78%). 
Initial results also suggest there is a moderate and positive relationship between 
rates of affective language usage and the importance of a political event.  When looking 
at all primary election dates (2/1/2016 – 6/7/2016), the rate of “F Word” usage in tweets 
mentioning Donald Trump increased on election dates with 50 or more delegates at stake 
in 11 of 12 cases (92%).  Conversely, rates of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning 
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Donald Trump increased on election dates with fewer than 50 delegates at stake in 4 of 8 
cases (50%).  During the “Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016), the rate of “F 
Word” usage in tweets mentioning Donald Trump increased surrounding the debates 
preceding Super Tuesday (3/1/2016).  The rate of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning 
Donald Trump spiked significantly on Super Tuesday (3/1/2016) and continued to do so 
for each subsequent primary election date during March.  During the “Confirmation 
Stage” (4/1/2016 – 6/30/2016), the rate of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning Donald 
Trump decreased and remained stable after he became the sole remaining primary 
candidate (5/10/2016).  A notable exception was found on 6/12/2016, which was the date 
of the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida.  On this date, Donald Trump 
registered the 2nd highest rate of “F Word” usage out of almost 900 daily observations in 
the data set.   
In sum, time series analyses of the Hypothesis #1 provided consistently 
compelling support for a temporal relationship between affective rhetoric and a political 
event.  Affective rhetoric in the form of positive and negative sentiment rose significantly 
during or immediately following days where a primary election or primary debate 
occurred.  Increases in the rates of  “F Word” usage aligned even more frequently with 
the same political events.  Even stronger support for Hypothesis #1 was found when 
accounting for the relative importance of a political event.  This was most evident when 
comparing primary election dates where fewer than 50 delegates were at stake with dates 
where 50 or more delegates were at stake. 
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Hypothesis #2: Online social networks tend to sequester unproductive messages in favor 
of constructive debate. 
 
The first set of tests of the second hypothesis employed the use of network 
visualization graphs across a span of individual days of observation.  This battery of tests 
was designed to identify differences in the overall shape and organization of networks 
with high and low incidences of extreme affective rhetoric: the “F Word”.  These tests 
were designed to provide a broad contextual picture of these networks’ structures and, in 
doing so, provide visual evidence of their overall connectivity and density.  Such 
contextual evidence is important because varying levels of density and connectivity are 
signs of varying levels of network polarization.  First, I used Gephi for Macintosh3 to 
create network visualizations for days with the five highest rates of  “F Word” usage and 
days with the five lowest rates of “F Word” usage.  Such an analysis is not intended to 
provide conclusive predictive powers, but rather is intended to demonstrate how 
unmoderated social networks behave differently when comparing periods of extremely 
high affective rhetoric to periods of low affective rhetoric.   
[Insert Visualization 1.1] 
 The first set of visualizations compare days with the top five most frequent use of 
the “F Word” alongside days with the top five least frequent use of the “F Word”.  When 
comparing the visualizations side by side, it is clear that the networks are indeed different 
in structure, density, and neighborhood dispersion.  This is evident in the visualizations in 
the first row (representing the days with the highest rates of the “F Word”), which 
                                                
3 See Chapter 3 
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demonstrate relatively small yet dense clusters of discussion dispersed throughout the 
peripheral regions of the networks.  Additionally, the surrounding spaces in these 
networks is littered with large collections of “one-step” nodes, where individuals are 
either sending or receiving a message one time and no more.  Last, there is little space 
between the communications in the center of the network and the largely unconnected 
ring of nodes encompassing the perimeter of the network.  This suggests that there are 
fewer nodes in the center of the network and fewer connections between communications 
in the center of the network and surrounding neighborhoods of discussion.  In turn, there 
is less of a repulsive force on surrounding nodes with few to no connections (indicative 
of non-influential members in the network).  
 Conversely, visualizations in the second row (representing the days with the 
lowest rates of the “F Word”) demonstrate relatively large clusters of shared 
conversation.  Further, the surrounding space consists largely of smaller neighborhoods 
of conversation connected directly to the larger central conversation.  Last, the largely 
unconnected ring of nodes encompassing the perimeter of the network is, in most cases 
pushed, further out from communications in the center of the network.  This suggests that 
there are more connected nodes in the center of the network and more connections 
between communications in the center of the network and surrounding neighborhoods.  
As a result, there is more of a repulsive force on surrounding nodes with few to no 
connections.  These differences in network structure are more clearly evident when 
viewing the visualizations in higher resolution: 
[Insert Visualization 2.1] 
[Insert Visualization 2.2] 
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[Insert Visualization 2.3] 
[Insert Visualization 2.4] 
[Insert Visualization 2.5] 
A final set of visualizations was created in order to locate these highly polarizing 
messages, examine their content, and identify their position with relation to the larger 
network of conversation and its influential participants.  The following visualizations 
isolate specific tweets containing the “F Word” by changing the color and size of nodes 
containing these words.  Doing so makes it easier to identify their location with respect to 
the center of discussion. 
[Insert Visualization 3.1] 
[Insert Visualization 3.2] 
[Insert Visualization 3.3] 
[Insert Visualization 3.4] 
[Insert Visualization 3.5] 
 Isolating messages with the “F Word” and illustrating their position with respect 
to the center of discussion produced some fascinating results.  When examining the days 
with the top five rates of “F Word” usage, it was found that messages containing the “F 
Word” were clustered outside of the center of discussion in all cases.  While the number 
of tweets with the “F Word” may have increased in the aggregate, they were not shared 
with influential members of the network.  As such, the impact and reach of these 
expressions of extremely affective rhetoric failed to gain influence in discussion about 
Donald Trump on these days.   
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These findings are important because they demonstrate two key points.  First, they 
demonstrate that frequency does not equal influence in the social media environment.  
After analyzing the dates with the five highest rates of “F Word” usage (out of 366 days 
of observation), in no case did tweets containing the “F Word” successfully enter the core 
of shared discussion.  Instead, in every instance these dense bubbles of extremely 
affective tweets were sequestered by members of the network.  Second, these findings 
provide valuable insight into the behavior of unmoderated and unfiltered networks.  
Rather put, these findings provide evidence of “self policing” on the part of Twitter users 
when it comes to extremely vulgar language.  As such, there is compelling evidence of an 
aversion to such types of language among those who wish to discuss, share, and even 
debate content related to a major political figure. 
  
Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter has presented evidence that social networks experience both 
increases in positive and negative language as well as extremely polarizing and 
unproductive words as a political event nears.  A candidate’s movement in the national 
polls has some influence, but this appears to be moderate in comparison.  Most 
importantly, there is strong evidence that despite an increase in such language, members 
of social networks tend to sequester such language in favor of constructive debate.  
Strikingly, such behavior is exhibited in the absence of significant controls over the 
content of the message or the anonymity of the messenger, which suggests there may be 
an element of “self policing” inherent in large, public, and open online social networks.  
The findings in this chapter could be considered as cause for a modicum of optimism in a 
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highly polarized climate where an inordinate amount of attention is often given to the 
loudest voices, and where perhaps a bit too much worry is wasted on the Twitter Trolls. 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that this chapter examined these 
relationships within the context of a primary election.  This context matters, because the 
nature of U.S. presidential primary elections is vastly different than the nature of U.S. 
presidential general elections.  These differences are both fundamental and significant, as 
they include (but are not limited to) different campaign strategies, different election 
schedules, different media coverage, and different levels of citizen involvement.  The 
nature, effects, and impact of these differences could – and likely do – influence the 
nature, effects, and impact of political discussion on social media.  While subsequent 
chapters in this dissertation examine two aspects of the U.S. presidential general election, 
they do so while testing different hypotheses than were presented in this chapter.  This 
provides several opportunities for future research examining whether the “big game 
effect” varies when comparing the unique battlegrounds of the U.S. presidential primary 
and U.S. presidential general election political environments. 
As social media continues to grow as a platform for individuals to gather, process, 
share, and debate political issues, its potential for affecting mass polarization also grows.  
Measuring how the frequency of affective rhetoric on social media changes over time 
with relation to the occurrence of a political event is an important step in better 
understanding how elite cues influence mass polarization in different information 
environments.  More importantly, measuring how social networks treat affective rhetoric 
provides valuable insight into whether increases in such language will have a net negative 
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effect on constructive debate, or whether it will be pushed to the fringes where its 
audience will be smaller and less influential. 
 77 
Graph 1.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary 
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 1.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 1.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
 80 
Graph 1.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1 
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and 
Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Positive and negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis 
software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 2.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary 
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 2.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 2.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis 
software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 2.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1 
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and 
Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of positive and negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content 
analysis software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 3.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary 
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.  
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 3.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis 
software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 3.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican 
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis 
software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Graph 3.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1 
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and 
Primaries 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets 
 
Notes:  
1Frequency of positive and negative in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content 
analysis software.  Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words. 
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Visualization 1.1: Comparing Network Structure1 in Days with Highest Rate of “F Word” 
to Days with Lowest Rates of “F Word” Usage 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 2.1: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with Highest Rate of “F Word” 
to Day with Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/17/2016) – 7.87 per 1,000 words 
  
Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (4/17/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 2.2: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 2nd Highest Rate of “F 
Word” to Day with 2nd Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
2nd Highest Rate: Donald Trump (6/12/2016) – 4.88 per 1,000 words 
  
2nd Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (12/22/2015) – 0.00 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 2.3: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 3rd Highest Rate of “F 
Word” to Day with 3rd Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
3rd Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/18/2016) – 4.09 per 1,000 words 
  
3rd Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (10/27/2015) – 0.00 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 2.4: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 4th Highest Rate of “F 
Word” to Day with 4th Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
4th Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/6/2016) – 3.97 per 1,000 words 
  
4th Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (3/11/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 2.5: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 5th Highest Rate of “F 
Word” to Day with 5th Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
5th Highest Rate: Donald Trump (3/15/2016) – 3.44 per 1,000 words 
  
5th Lowest Rate: John Kasich (3/19/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 3.1: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective 
Rhetoric on Day with Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Donald Trump (4/17/2016) – 7.87 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 3.2: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective 
Rhetoric on Day with 2nd Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Donald Trump (6/12/2016) – 4.88 per 1,000 words 
 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 3.3: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective 
Rhetoric on Day with 3rd Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Donald Trump (4/18/2016) – 4.09 per 1,000 words 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 3.4: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective 
Rhetoric on Day with 4th Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Donald Trump (4/6/2016) – 3.97 per 1,000 words 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Visualization 3.5: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective 
Rhetoric on Day with 5th Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage 
 
Donald Trump (3/15/2016) – 3.44 per 1,000 words 
 
Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016) 
1Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh 
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Introduction 
The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign was marked by a daily onslaught of disputes 
between Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and their surrogates.  Whether these 
confrontations involved e-mails, tax returns, the Russian government, reality television, 
temperament, white supremacist groups, health issues, a history of misogynistic behavior, 
or one of a number of other seemingly endless controversies, they all seemed to share a 
common tone in their discourse: contempt.  This atmosphere of relentless confrontation, 
controversy, and contempt took center stage during each of the three presidential debates 
and in front of record-breaking television audiences, leading many to ask whether such 
visible divisiveness on the part of political elites may have contributed to mass 
polarization. 
This chapter measures the real-time effects of elite polarization on social 
networks by drawing upon an original data set of approximately 1,500,000 tweets 
captured live during the first 2016 U.S. presidential debate. I measure shifts in sentiment, 
network dynamics, and neighborhood structure during the one-minute time frame 
immediately following especially controversial or confrontational candidate statements 
and exchanges. The nature of these causal relationships offers unique insight into the 
influence polarizing messages by elites may have on mass polarization, especially when 
observed in a live and extremely politically charged atmosphere. 
 
Instant Effects during High Stakes Political Events 
Recent research in the field of political communication has focused on the 
phenomenon of hybrid media events, wherein social media is used alongside and during 
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televised political events.  Referred to as “dual screening”, the viewing public expands its 
role from being a mostly passive consumer of information to being an active member of 
the political event itself.  These roles often involve members of the general public using 
social media to engage in “lay tutelage” behavior, including the acts of fact-checking, 
correcting, counter-claiming, or highlighting biased reporting (Vaccari, Chadwick, & 
O’Loughlin 2015).  Within this environment, the power of event participants to shape the 
narrative increases in proportion to their relative influence when measured by their 
number of active followers.  In such a scenario, these event participants may serve as 
“bridging elites” with an influential power that can rival that of media and political elites 
(Freelon & Karpf 2015). 
Findings such as these have been quite valuable in better describing and 
explaining the roles individuals play in politically charged social media environments, as 
well as the types of individuals who play these roles.  At the same time, more needs to be 
known regarding how elite messages originating in the traditional media environment 
shapes the network structures that facilitate social media participants’ roles, whether they 
be participating in a bridging elite, lay tutelage, or passive observer function.  Further, a 
better understanding of the nature of how these network structures shift can provide 
valuable context for interpreting the relative influence of participants regardless of their 
roles.  
 
Research Design 
 This chapter examines the extent to which polarizing behavior on the part of elites 
within a live and politically charged environment influences online spaces in a way that 
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creates conditions where mass polarization may develop.  The analysis in this chapter is 
unique, as it offers a perspective that is both immediate and unfiltered.  Further, it takes 
place in an environment where the variable of participant self-selection has less influence 
than would be the case in a traditional media setting.  First, individuals’ choice in their 
media source for the debate has virtually no impact on the way in which the political 
information is being received.  Rather put, the content of elite cues is delivered in an 
unbiased and direct manner, regardless of whether an individual watches the debate 
unfold on Fox News, MSNBC, CNN, or some other channel.  An individual cannot 
choose to receive these cues from a source that aligns with their ideology, as competing 
views are part and parcel of a televised debate.  Second, individuals’ reactions to elite 
cues are being observed in an unfiltered and ideological neutral environment.  
Specifically, reactions are only observed for individuals who have shared their messages 
using the official Twitter hashtag for the 2016 presidential debates.  
 
Research Questions 
In order to test for a potential link between elite polarization and mass 
polarization in these unique dual environments, this chapter investigates two sequentially 
dependent research questions.  Specifically, the first research question looks for the 
effects of elite cues in online spaces, while the second research question measures how 
the unique nature of social networks impact the extent to which any such effects matter. 
 
Research Question #1: How do polarizing messages by elites influence the 
nature of political discourse in online spaces? 
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The first section of this chapter seeks to determine if there are any relationships 
between expressions of polarizing behavior on the part of political elites and a resulting 
reaction among individuals that could indicate the seeds for mass polarization are being 
sown.  Using the first presidential debate as my testing grounds, I identify moments 
during the debate where either of the two candidates made statements that could be 
perceived as confrontational, controversial, or contemptuous.  These moments are used as 
proxies for the independent variable of elite polarization.  Levels of affective rhetoric and 
abstract thought in individuals’ tweets during each minute of the debate are used to 
measure the extent to which the preconditions for mass polarization are developing or 
diminishing at different moments during the debate.  Finally, a time series analysis is 
utilized to determine if moments of confrontation, controversy, or contempt on the part of 
the two candidates result in a shift in frequency of affective rhetoric or abstract thought 
on the part of individuals watching the debate live.  In essence, the first section seeks to 
answer the question: “Does it happen?” 
 
Research Question #2:  
How does the nature of political discourse in online spaces influence the creation 
of polarized communities? 
 
While the first section of this chapter looks for causal links between polarizing 
messages by elites and shifts in mass affective rhetoric, the second section of this chapter 
seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between shifts in mass affective 
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rhetoric and the formation of polarized communities of discussion.  Drawing upon 
periods with high rates of affective rhetoric in tweets, I conduct network metrics analyses 
to measure the size of communities of discussion and the relative efficiency of the 
networks within which these communities form.  These metrics provide evidence as to 
the relative levels of polarization within a given network at a given time.  If evidence of 
polarized communities exist, this would suggest mechanisms exist which would facilitate 
a causal link between elite polarization in the form of elite cues and mass polarization in 
social media.  Further, this approach may provide even further clarity regarding the 
extent to which different types of elite cues lead to different types of mass polarization in 
social media.  In essence, the second section seeks to answer the question: “Does it 
matter?” 
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt cause an 
instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in viewers’ responses. 
Hypothesis #2: Environments with elevated levels of affective rhetoric are 
conducive to the creation of polarized communities. 
 
Methods and Data 
Data Collection  
Data for this chapter was gathered using the Twitter Live Stream function in 
Gephi version 0.9.1 for Macintosh.  All tweets containing #Debates2016 were collected 
roughly five minutes before the start of the debate and continuing through approximately 
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one hour of post-debate discussion. The decision to track #Debates2016 was based upon 
Twitter’s announcement that this would be their official hashtag for the 2016 presidential 
debates.  For this analysis, I truncated the full data set of all #Debates2016 tweets to 
include only those occurring from the start of the debate through approximately six 
minutes following the debate’s conclusion.  The reasoning for this was two-fold: First, I 
assumed that discussion regarding the final minute (94) of the debate would continue for 
several minutes.  Second, examining a full 100 minutes of debate reactions provided a 
balanced scope for data analysis allowing for an economical time frame divisibility.  
During the debate, a time log was kept to document the tweet count at each one minute 
mark, beginning with Lester Holt’s first comment welcoming the audience to the debate.   
Following the debate, the truncated data set of approximately 1,500,000 tweets 
was divided into 100 individual one-minute data sets of approximately 15,000 tweets 
each.  Official transcripts for the debate were studied carefully to identify moments of 
confrontation, controversy, and contempt, then these moments were time stamped by 
synchronizing them with the official video of the debate.  The first presidential debate 
had no shortage of such moments, so effort was made to choose the most obvious and 
egregious cases.  
[see Appendix A] 
 
Content Analysis 
The primary tool for conducting content analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software 
application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill 
University.  This software was used in conjunction with the Regressive Imagery 
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Dictionary (Martindale 1975, 1990), which is comprised of approximately 3,000 words 
divided into three primary categories with 44 sub-categories.  These categories are 
divided into Primary Processes, which include drive, sensation, defensive symbolization, 
regressive cognition, and Icarian imagery; Secondary Processes, which include 
abstraction, social behavior, instrumental behavior, restraint, order, temporal references, 
and moral imperative; and Emotions, which include positive affect, anxiety, sadness, 
affection, aggression, expressive behavior, and glory.4  For this project, I selected the 
Emotions category as a proxy for affective rhetoric.  I also selected the Secondary 
Processes category as a proxy for the opposite of affective rhetoric.  Including this second 
category provided a valuable comparative measure to provide context for the analysis of 
affective rhetoric in the form of emotional responses. 
[Insert Table 1.1] 
The full text for each minute of observation during the debate was processed 
through Lexicoder 3.0 and the Regressive Imagery Dictionary, producing 100 individual 
data sets containing raw counts for each of the 14 Emotion and Secondary Process 
subcategories.  These raw counts were then converted into rates by dividing them into the 
total number of words tweeted during each minute of observation.  In order to make these 
numbers more usable, they have been reported as “positive words per 1,000 words” or 
“negative words per 1,000 words”. 
 
Network Analysis 
                                                
4 See Chapter 2 
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 Several network metrics were utilized to measure for signs of relative polarization 
between networks.  First, I tested for modularity and average community size, as these 
measures provide an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are 
in the network.  Generally speaking, networks with high levels of modularity feature 
communities of discussion containing dense internal connections and weak external 
connections to other communities of discussion.  Measures of average community size 
are especially useful when analyzing two or more networks with each other, as this 
provides a tool for comparing the tendency of individuals in a particular network to 
cluster together around a certain piece of information. 
Second, I tested for closeness centrality distribution and average path length, as 
these measures provide evidence of a network’s efficiency.  Generally speaking, 
networks featuring clusters of nodes with high closeness centrality and with low relative 
average path lengths tend to be more efficient networks.  For example, a network with a 
closeness centrality distribution of 1 and an average path length of 1 would be a system 
of perfect information, where each participant would receive the same amount of 
information in only one step.  Conversely, a network with a closeness centrality 
distribution of close to 0 and an average path length of 6 would be a system where 
information required a number of steps to travel across the network and where very few 
participants would be exposed to the same information. 
 Last, I used network visualization techniques to provide a big picture view of each 
network’s architecture.  While network visualizations are less precise than traditional 
network metrics, they can help to illustrate shifts in the networks as a whole.  For 
example, a dense and interconnected network with a great deal of shared information will 
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be evident by tight clusters of nodes near the center of the visualizations, while polarized 
and disconnected networks will be evident by relatively large clusters of nodes appearing 
sporadically near the periphery of the larger network. 
 
 
Findings 
“Does it happen?” 
 
Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt cause an 
instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in viewers’ responses. 
 
The first test of this hypothesis involved a contextual view of how rates of 
emotion and secondary process words rose and fell over the span of the debate.  Rates of 
words expressing emotion were used as broad proxies for affective rhetoric, while rates 
of words expressing secondary processes were used as broad proxies for objective 
discussion.  The main goal of this first test was to get a “lay of the land” to see if there 
were any identifiable patterns in tweet content and, more importantly, to see if these 
patterns aligned with any of the preselected moments of confrontation, controversy, or 
contempt during the debate. 
[Insert Graph 1.1] 
The first time series analysis showed a clear flow of sentiment shifts throughout 
the debate, both for the emotion and secondary process categories.  Interestingly enough, 
rates of secondary process language were generally higher than rates of emotional 
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language.  This was surprising considering the heated nature of the first presidential 
debate.  It was also interesting to note that rates of secondary process language peaked 
during the middle of the debate, while rates of emotion peaked near the end.   
Such trends could have been due to at least two causes.  First, it is possible that 
the content of the candidates’ speech was more policy oriented, less charged with 
rhetoric, and more thought-provoking, due to the types of questions asked by the 
moderator.  Given that television is still largely an entertainment medium, it would not be 
surprising if moderators (who are typically also network news anchors) intentionally 
order the type and content of their questions in order to create a better “show” for the 
audience.  Second, it is possible that candidates strategically inserted a higher frequency 
of emotional cues during the beginning and end of the debate in order to maximize 
rhetorical impact during periods of the debate where viewers’ attention was more 
focused.  Both possibilities are intriguing and could be tested by comparing the content of 
Lester Holt’s questions with an analysis of the content of the candidates’ responses.  Such 
a content analysis could be performed using the excellent Laver and Garry Dictionary of 
Policy Position (1992).  These interesting observations aside, only rates of emotion were 
examined closely in the time series analysis, as this provided the best means for testing 
the first hypothesis most directly. 
[Insert Graph 1.2] 
[Insert Graph 1.3] 
The time series analysis of emotion rates in tweets was conducted using two 
graphs.  The first reported the combined rate of all seven sub-categories of words 
expressing emotion from the Regressive Imagery Dictionary, while the second the rates 
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for each individual sub-category.  The purpose of this approach was to provide the 
opportunity to identify trends in overall emotion while also having the ability to focus on 
specific types of emotions that may have been driving overall shifts in the wider 
category.    
Sentiment was relatively flat until the first moment where Clinton accused Trump 
of rooting for the housing crisis, to which Trump responded “That’s called business, by 
the way.”  There were only slight shifts in emotion rates, driven primarily by expressions 
of anxiety and glory.  A more noticeable upward trend in rates of emotion occurred 
following Minute 18, following a period of crosstalk between the candidates which ended 
with Clinton stating, “Well, Donald, I know you live in your own reality.”  This was 
driven primarily by increases in expressive behavior and positive affect. 
Even more noticeable increases in rates of emotion occurred immediately 
following Minute 28, where the issues of Trump’s tax returns and Clinton’s e-mails took 
center stage.  These increases were influenced by significant increases in anxiety and 
sadness.  The shift in rates of sadness was interesting, as prior to this point in the debate 
rates of sadness were at or slightly above 0.  Rates of emotion also trended upwards 
significantly following Trump’s claim that “Secretary Clinton doesn’t want to use a 
couple of words, and that’s law and order” and the subsequent debate topic shift to the 
issue of “stop and frisk” starting at Minute 43.  These increases were driven by upward 
trends in the rates of glory, affection, expressive behavior, and sadness.  Interestingly, 
rates of anxiety remained at 0 during this topic. 
Rates of emotion remained fairly steady with very few fluctuations in rates 
following this interchange and continuing through disputes over which candidate was 
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responsible for promoting the “birther” controversy, accusations of racist behavior, 
disputes regarding the role of Russia in the hacking of the Democratic National 
Committee e-mails, and confrontational moments involving Trump’s position that he did 
not support the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  These patterns in tweet content remained 
consistent through Minute 78.   
To be clear, rates of emotion and secondary process did not flat line during this 30 
minute period, as rate fluctuations varied by as much as 50% from any given minute to 
the next.  Further, there were noticeable shifts in the rates of individual emotions.  For 
example, rates of anxiety increased at to their highest rates at Minute 47 following 
Clinton’s comment, “I've heard Donald say this at his rallies, and it's really unfortunate 
that he paints such a dire negative picture of black communities in our country”, to which 
Trump responded, “Ugh.”  This interchange was accompanied by an increase in rates of 
anxiety from 0 to 0.273 per 1,000 words (674% above the average rate of anxiety for the 
entire debate).  There was also a corresponding spike in words related to expressive 
behavior following the dispute between Clinton and Trump regarding whether or not 
murders in New York City increased following the end of “stop and frisk” policies.  
These instances aside, fluctuations on the whole did not align clearly and consistently 
enough with the identified moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt to draw 
any conclusions.  This could be due to a number of factors, not the least of which would 
involve the fairly high frequency with which these moments occurred during this 30 
minute stretch.  Rather put, the almost constant disagreements on a wide range of issues 
during this period may have created an atmosphere of “background noise”. 
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If the 30 minute segment of the debate featuring a high frequency of back and 
forth exchanges on multiple issues created a form of background noise, the final 15 
minutes were punctuated by two of the most memorable moments of the debate – both of 
which involved arguably the most controversial statements and confrontational 
atmosphere, as well as the strongest expressions of contempt.  Specifically, these closing 
minutes of the debate began with the following statements made by Trump at Minute 78 
(and 18 seconds):  
“Well, I have much better judgment than she does.  There’s no question about 
that.  I also have a much better temperament than she has, you know? … I think 
my strongest asset, maybe by far, is my temperament.  I have a winning 
temperament.  I know how to win.”   
Clinton responded to Trump’s one-minute long discussion about temperament 
with a few playful wiggles of her shoulders, followed by an amused and somewhat 
exasperated “Whew!” at Minute 79. This interchange elicited by far the most impressive 
increases in rates of emotion in tweets, rising from a rate of 0.696 per 1,000 words during 
Minute 77 to rates of 1.221 and 1.270 per 1,000 words during Minutes 78 and 79, and 
peaking at a rate of 6.555 per 1,000 words during Minute 80.  This represented a 942% 
increase in the rates of emotion in tweets from the moments before Trump began 
discussing his temperament to the moments after Clinton’s response.  These increases in 
the rate of emotion were primarily driven by extreme increases in the rates of aggression 
and positive affect in tweets.  Specifically, between Minute 77 and Minute 80, rates of 
positive affect increased from 0.0502 per 1,000 words to 0.6741 per 1,000 words 
(1,343% increase) while rates of aggression increased from 0.424 per 1,000 words to 
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5.443 per 1,000 words (1,284% increase).  Rates of aggression and positive affect at 
Minute 80 were both at their highest recorded levels for the entire debate, indicating that 
this interchange had by far the biggest emotional impact on the #Debates2016 Twitter 
participants. 
Rates of emotion in tweets remained high for several minutes after this 
interchange, staying well about the average rate of emotion over the entire span of the 
debate.  However, the second of the two most memorable moments of the debate aligned 
with Clinton’s scathing criticism of Trump’s attempts to “switch (the discussion) from 
looks to stamina” at Minute 91, and the ensuing confrontation: 
Clinton: “this is a man who has called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone 
who has said pregnancy is an inconvenience to employers, who has said …” 
Trump: “I never said that.” 
Clinton: “women don’t deserve equal pay unless they do as good a job as men.” 
Trump: “I didn’t say that.” 
Clinton: “And one of the worst things he said was about a woman in a beauty 
contest.  He loves beauty contests, supporting them and hanging around them.  
And he called this woman ‘Miss Piggy.’  Then he called her ‘Miss 
Housekeeping,’ because she was Latina.  Donald, she has a name.” 
Trump: “Where did you find this?  Where did you find this?” 
Clinton: “Her name is Alicia Machado.” 
Trump: “Where did you find this?” 
Clinton: “And she has become a U.S. citizen, and you can bet…” 
Trump: “Oh, really?” 
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Clinton: “… she’s going to vote this November.” 
  
 This interchange between the two candidates, starting at Minute 91 and 
continuing through Minute 92 (and 30 seconds) aligned with a spike in emotion in tweets 
from 1.185 per 1,000 words to 2.597 per 1,000 words, representing an increase of 219% 
in one minute.  Rates of emotion in tweets remained above average for the final minute of 
the debate following this confrontation.  These increases in emotion rates were likely 
driven by increases in the individual measures of aggression, anxiety, glory, and positive 
affect. 
 The initial results of the time series analysis provided some support for the first 
hypothesis, as there were clearly some interchanges that elicited instant emotional 
responses in individuals discussing the debate on Twitter as it unfolded live on television.  
However, these results were mixed, as there were moments during the middle third of the 
debate where no definitive relationship was evident.   
These mixed initial results could have been due to the one-minute time frame of 
observation being too fine of a unit of measurement; it is possible that some debate 
moments do not lend themselves well to precise measurements in minutes and seconds.  
Instead, such moments may be better defined as periods of exchange, rather than specific 
statements.  Further, the one-minute time frame of measurement could exclude the 
responses from individuals who do not respond within 60 seconds.  Rather put, while 
some debate viewers might have responded instantly on Twitter, others might have taken 
a minute or two to access their phone or computer and might have taken even more time 
to type out their responses.  In order to account for the potential for observation error 
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when using a one-minute time frame as the unit of measurement, an alternate approach 
was used when analyzing the time series data. 
[Insert Graph 1.4] 
[Insert Graph 1.5] 
 For this brief follow-up analysis, I isolated four distinct segments within the 
debate where there were especially focused confrontational, controversial, or 
contemptuous interchanges between the candidates.  These segments were six minutes in 
length, and consisted of interchanges between the candidates involving Trump’s taxes 
and Clinton’s e-mails (Minutes 28 – 33), the issue of law and order (Minutes 42 – 47), 
the issue of temperament (Minutes 78 – 83), and the “words matter” segment centering 
on Donald Trump’s statements about women (Minutes 90 – 95).  I also isolated two 
additional segments to be used as control sets: the opening moments of the debate 
(Minutes 1 – 6) and the segment of the debate when rates of emotional language in 
#Debates2016 tweets were at their lowest and steadiest (Minutes 13 – 18).   
When examining the time series graph using six-minute segments as the 
dependent variable, a clear pattern emerged with respect to the moments of the debate 
which elicited the strongest emotional responses from the #Debates2016 audience.  The 
four largest and most consistent spikes in rates of emotional language were centered 
around the “temperament”, “words matter”, “law and order”, and “taxes and e-mails” 
candidate interchanges.  These findings, when combined with the first set of findings, 
lend strong supporting evidence for Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation, 
controversy, and contempt cause an instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in 
viewers’ responses. 
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“Does it matter?” 
 
Hypothesis #2: Environments with elevated levels of affective rhetoric are 
conducive to the creation of polarized communities. 
 
 On their own, the findings that there were increases in emotional language in 
Tweets following moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt were not all that 
surprising.  However, establishing evidence of such a relationship is an important 
precondition for testing the second hypothesis.  For the second section of this analysis, I 
used network analysis metrics and visualizations to gain a better understanding regarding 
the nature and structure of the discrete networks that form in response to moments of 
confrontation, controversy, and contempt and, more importantly, facilitate increased rates 
of affective rhetoric in individuals’ responses. 
 For this analysis, I chose to test the same five segments from the second half of 
the time series analysis.  This decision was based upon the reasoning that too fine a level 
of detail would potentially create similar observational inconsistencies as were 
experienced in the first time series analysis.  Confining the network analysis observations 
to a one-minute time frame reduced measurement of the independent variable to a single 
candidate statement, rather than taking into account the full content of an exchange 
between candidates or the development of a candidate’s argument or defense.  Further, 
given that the resulting networks are the product of individuals’ comments, it was likely 
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that confining the analysis to one-minute time frames would hamper the value of the 
dependent variable by omitting contributions by individuals who took more than 60 
seconds to access their phone or computer and to post their responses to Twitter.   
 
Visualizations 
 Given that the second hypothesis seeks to find a relationship between elevated 
levels of affective rhetoric and the formation of polarized communities, the visualizations 
were analyzed by comparing the network with the lowest rate of emotional language 
(Minutes 13 – 18) with the networks containing the highest rates of emotional language 
(“Taxes & E-mails”, “Law & Order”, “Temperament”, and “Words Matter”).  Using rates 
of emotional language as a proxy for affective rhetoric, there should be noticeable 
differences in the general structure of these four networks compared to the control sample 
network. 
 [Insert Visualization 1.1] 
[Insert Visualization 1.2] 
[Insert Visualization 1.3] 
[Insert Visualization 1.4] 
 When analyzing each of these “high emotion” debate segments with the “low 
emotion” control segment, there were some notable differences.  For example, while 
there were several clustered communities appearing outside of the center of discussion, 
these were not located relative far from the center.  Additionally, these clusters had 
several clear connections with each other, suggesting that a measure of communication 
was occurring between them.  Conversely, visualizations for the four “high emotion” 
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debate segments featured a higher number of clustered communities appearing outside of 
the center of discussion.  Further, these clusters were closer to the periphery of the 
network while demonstrating fewer connections with other clusters.  This suggests these 
networks were somewhat more polarized than the network for the control segment.   
While network visualizations are often useful analytical tools for examining 
interactions between individuals in a networked environment, there are times with such 
an analysis is limited in its descriptive power for testing hypotheses.  Ultimately, while 
the comparison of network visualizations immediately following each of the five debate 
themes did illustrate variations in network architecture as a whole, these comparisons did 
not provide robust descriptive power for indentifying the formation of polarized 
communities.  This could have been due to a combination of the high volume of tweets 
and the small time frame within which these tweets were being made.   
 
Comparative Network Metrics 
A final battery of tests was applied in order to look for evidence of network 
polarization during different segments during the debate.  Such evidence was sought by 
measuring changes in network efficiency and community density.  Rather put, if the 
network during a particular six-minute segment was less efficient (indicated by high 
average path lengths) and more dense (indicated by high average community sizes) than 
another six-minute segment, this would suggest a stronger likelihood of concentrated 
polarization in the former segment than in the latter. 
 [Insert Graph 1.6] 
[Insert Graph 1.7] 
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[Insert Graph 1.8] 
 Where the network visualizations did not provide the most robust evidence of 
shifts in network polarization during varying periods of emotional language by network 
participants, the comparative network metrics analysis provided some compelling 
evidence.  This evidence is particularly evident in Graph 1.7, which measures relative 
efficiency and intensity of the networks during different segments of the debate. 
 Generally speaking, networks with high average path lengths are less efficient for 
sharing information, as an increase in path length means information must make a higher 
number of “jumps” between one node to the next.  Networks with an average path length 
of 1 represent an environment of perfect information, as all messages in that network 
reach all other nodes in that network in one step.  Average path length can also be viewed 
as one indicator of polarization, since the network as a whole becomes more unified as 
this value decreases and becomes more dispersed as this value increases.   
Average community size can be viewed as one indicator of network 
concentration, as it measures the average number of nodes connected within a shared 
neighborhood.  In essence, these two values are best interpreted as a pair: Networks with 
high average path lengths and high average community sizes suggest high levels of 
concentrated polarization, while networks with low average path lengths and low average 
community sizes suggest low levels of diffuse polarization.  Similarly, networks with 
high average path lengths and low community sizes suggest high levels of diffuse 
polarization, while networks with low average path lengths and high average community 
sizes suggest low levels of concentrated polarization. 
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 This analysis provides strong evidence to support Hypothesis #2, as the two 
debate segments which elicited the highest rates of emotional language also produced the 
two highest combined measures of average path and average community size.  
Specifically, the networks that developed in the wake of the “temperament” and “words 
matter” interchanges were marked by especially concentrated polarized communities of 
discussion.  Such findings are especially noteworthy considering these two segments also 
contained arguably the most emotionally charged and personalized interchanges of the 
debate.  Conversely, the “lowest emotion” segment of the debate produced the lowest 
combined measures of average path and average community size, while the “debate start” 
segment (representing the segment with the second lowest rates of emotion) produced the 
second lowest combined measures of average path and average community size. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 The first goal of this chapter was to determine whether a relationship exists 
between polarizing behavior in the form of elite cues and increases in mass affective 
rhetoric.  There were clear relationships between moments of confrontation, controversy, 
and contempt between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during the first presidential 
debate and subsequent rises in affective rhetoric in the form of emotional language 
among #Debates2016 participants on Twitter.  This was especially evident in the 
emotional subcategories of positive affect and aggression.  By offering evidence to the 
question of “Does it happen?”, this finding provides a valuable tool for testing whether or 
not there exists a causal chain between elite polarization and mass polarization in social 
media. 
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 The second goal of this chapter was to determine whether or not elevated levels of 
affective rhetoric in the form of emotional language shape the architecture of the 
networks in a way that is conducive to mass polarization.  Significant evidence was found 
indicating that moments of intense confrontation, controversy, and contempt correlated 
with indicators of polarized networks.  This was especially true for moments where 
interchanges between the candidates included especially personal character attacks.  It 
should be stressed that while this evidence does not demonstrate the existence of mass 
polarization in response to exposure to elite polarization, it does demonstrate that elite 
polarization can influence the creation of polarized communities which could, in turn, 
facilitate affective polarization.  In doing so, such evidence warrants a closer look into the 
nature of communication that is occurring within these polarized communities.  Such an 
approach is pursued in Chapter 5.   
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Appendix A: Moments of Confrontation, Controversy, and Contempt during the first 
2016 U.S. Presidential Debate 
 
12:00 Trump: “That’s called business, by the way” 
(12) (Clinton said Trump “rooted for the housing crisis”) 
 
13:45 Clinton: “Donald thinks that climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese” 
(14) Trump: “I did not. I did not. I do not say that.” 
 … 
 Trump: “She talks about solar panels. We invested in a solar company, our 
country.  
That was a disaster.” 
 
15:40 Trump: “You’ve been doing this for 30 years.” 
(16-18) [CROSSTALK] 
  NAFTA “is the single worst trade deal ever approved in this country.” 
 
17:20 Trump: “You haven’t done it in 30 years or 26 years” etc 
  [CROSSTALK] 
 Clinton: “Well, that’s your opinion. That is your opinion.” 
 
18:20 Trump: “You called [the TPP] the gold standard.” 
(18)  [CROSSTALK] 
 Clinton: “Well, Donald, I know you live in your own reality,” 
  [CROSSTALK] 
 Holt: “We’re going to move to …” 
  
25:30 Clinton: “Trump loophole” 
(26)  [CROSSTALK] 
  “Trumped up trickle down” 
  Debt free college 
 
28:00 [Holt begins Q&A about Trump releasing his tax returns] 
(28) 
30:00 Trump: “I will release my tax returns, against my lawyer’s wishes, when she 
releases her 
  33,000 e-mails that have been deleted.” 
 
31:00 Clinton: “Maybe he’s not as rich as he says he is.” 
    “Maybe he doesn’t want the American people … to know that he’s paid 
nothing 
  in federal taxes.” 
 Trump: “That makes me smart.” 
 Clinton: “it must be something really important, even terrible, that he's trying to 
hide.” 
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33:00 Clinton: “I made a mistake using a private e-mail.” 
(33) Trump: “That’s for sure.” 
 [more talk about tax returns] 
 
36:00 Clinton: “And maybe because you haven't paid any federal income tax for a lot of 
years.” 
(36)  
37:00 Clinton: “Do the thousands of people that you have stiffed over the course of your 
business not deserve some kind of apology from someone who has taken 
their 
labor, taken the goods that they produced, and then refused to pay them?” 
 
43:00 Trump: “Secretary Clinton doesn't want to use a couple of words, and that's law 
and 
(43)  order. And we need law and order. If we don't have it, we're not going to 
have 
a country. 
 
45:00 [Stop and Frisk] 
 
47:00 Clinton: “I've heard Donald say this at his rallies, and it's really unfortunate that 
he paints 
(47) such a dire negative picture of black communities in our country.” 
 Trump: “Ugh.” 
 
51:30 Trump: “I agree … I think we have to look very strongly at no-fly lists and watch 
lists.” 
 
52:00 Trump: “you were the one that brought up the words super-predator about young  
black youth” 
 
53:00 Clinton: “under the current mayor, crime has continued to drop, including 
murders. 
(53)  So there is...” 
 Trump: “No, you’re wrong. You’re wrong.” 
 Clinton: “No, I’m not.” 
 Trump: “Murders are up. All right. You check it. 
 
54:30 Trump: “Look, the African-American community has been let down by our 
politicians. 
They talk good around election time, like right now, and after the election, 
they 
said, see ya later, I'll see you in four years.” 
 
55:20 Clinton: “think Donald just criticized me for preparing for this debate. And, yes, I 
did. 
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And you know what else I prepared for? I prepared to be president. And I 
think 
that's a good thing.” 
 
56:00 [Obama birth certificate] 
(56) 
58:40 Clinton: “Well, just listen to what you heard. [Trump] tried to put the whole racist  
birther lie to bed … started his political activity based on this racist lie.” 
 
60:00 Clinton: “[Trump] has a long record of engaging in racist behavior.” 
 … “When they go low, we go high.” 
 
61:00 Trump: “you even sent out or your campaign sent out pictures of him in a certain 
garb, 
very famous pictures. I don't think you can deny that.” 
 
63:30 Clinton: “I know Donald's very praiseworthy of Vladimir Putin” 
(64) 
65:00 Clinton: “I was so shocked when Donald publicly invited Putin to hack into 
Americans.” 
 
66:30 [Trump “400 pound hacker”] 
 “You don't know who broke in to DNC. But what did we learn with DNC? We 
learned 
that Bernie Sanders was taken advantage of by your people, by 
Debbie Wasserman Schultz.” 
 
71:00 Clinton: “Donald supported the invasion of Iraq.” 
(71) Trump: “Wrong.” 
 Clinton: “That is absolutely proved over and over again.” 
 Trump: “Wrong. Wrong.” 
 
76:30 [More on Trump supporting Iraq war] 
 [CROSSTALK] with Holt 
 
78:18 Trump: “Well, I have much better judgment than she does. There's no question 
about 
(78)  that. I also have a much better temperament than she has, you know?” 
 Trump: “I think my strongest asset, maybe by far, is my temperament. I have a 
winning 
temperament. I know how to win.” 
 Trump: “I don't know who you were talking to, Secretary Clinton, but you were 
totally 
out of control. I said, there's a person with a temperament that's got a 
problem.” 
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79:00 Clinton: “Whew, OK.” 
 [Shoulder shimmy] 
 
80:40 [Dispute over Iranian sailors taunting American sailors] 
 
81:10 [Dispute over use of nuclear proliferation] 
(81) 
82:00 Clinton: “a man who can be provoked by a tweet should not have his fingers 
anywhere 
near the nuclear codes” 
 Trump: “That line’s getting a little bit old, I must say.” 
 
84:45 Trump: “another one powerful is the worst deal I think I've ever seen negotiated 
that you 
started is the Iran deal.” 
 
86:00 Clinton: “Well, let me -- let me start by saying, words matter. Words matter when 
you 
(86)  run for president. And they really matter when you are president.” 
 
89:30 [“I don’t think she has the presidential look.”] 
 
90:45 Trump: “Hillary has experience, but it's bad experience. We have made so many 
bad 
deals during the last -- so she's got experience, that I agree.” 
 
91:30 Clinton: “You know, he tried to switch from looks to stamina. But this is a man 
who has 
(91)  called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone who has said pregnancy 
is an 
inconvenience to employers, who has said...” 
Trump: “I never said that.” 
Clinton: “… women don't deserve equal pay unless they do as good a job as 
men.” 
Trump: “I didn't say that.” 
 
91:50 Clinton: “And one of the worst things he said was about a woman in a beauty 
contest. He 
loves beauty contests, supporting them and hanging around them. And he 
called 
this woman "Miss Piggy." Then he called her "Miss Housekeeping," 
because she 
was Latina. Donald, she has a name.” 
Trump: “Where did you find this? Where did you find this?” 
 
92:15 Clinton: “Her name is Alicia Machado.” 
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Trump: “Where did you find this?” 
Clinton: “And she has become a U.S. citizen, and you can bet...” 
Trump: “Oh, really?” 
Clinton: “... she's going to vote this November.” 
 
93:00 Trump: “I was going to say something extremely rough to Hillary, to her family, 
and I 
said to myself, "I can't do it. I just can't do it. It's inappropriate. It's not 
nice.” 
 
93:30 [Are you willing to accept the outcome as the will of the voters?” 
 Clinton: “Well, I support our democracy. And sometimes you win, sometimes you 
lose. 
But I certainly will support the outcome of this election.” 
  
94:50 Trump: “The answer is, if she wins, I will absolutely support her.” 
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Table 1.1: Emotion and Secondary Process Categories, Regressive Imagery Dictionary 
 
 
 
Source: Provalis Research, https://provalisresearch.com/products/content-analysis-
software/wordstat-dictionary/regressive-imagery-dictionary/ 
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Graph 1.1: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Secondary 
Process vs. Rates of Emotion 
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Graph 1.2: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion 
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Graph 1.3: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion by 
Category 
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Graph 1.4: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion  
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt 
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Graph 1.5: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion by 
Category 
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt 
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Graph 1.6: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Average Community 
Size and Modularity 
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt 
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Graph 1.7: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Average Path Length 
and Closeness 
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt 
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Graph 1.8: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Relative Community 
Polarization 
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt 
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Visualization 1.1: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Taxes & Emails” 
segment 
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Visualization 1.2: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Law & Order” segment 
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Visualization 1.3: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Temperament” segment 
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Visualization 1.4: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Words Matter” segment 
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Introduction 
On April 13, 2016, the Southern Poverty Law Center published a report asserting 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was “producing an alarming level of fear and 
anxiety” in our nation’s schools while “inflaming racial and ethnic tensions” (Costello 
2016). Labeled the “Trump Effect”, this phenomenon received significant media attention 
and was cited by Hillary Clinton in her August 25, 2016, “alt-right” speech.  The report 
raised important questions regarding how presidential candidates’ patterns of speech may 
influence feelings of resentment, fear, or incivility.  However, consistent with the 
Southern Poverty Law Center’s own admissions, the report lacked scientific rigor in its 
methodology and reporting.  Despite these flaws, the concerns voiced by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center have significant societal implications, especially when placed into 
the context of the United States presidency.  As such, these concerns beg for scientific 
research to examine the relationship between messages delivered by political elites and 
the behavior of those who receive these messages.  
This chapter seeks to determine the extent to which a “Trump Effect” manifests 
itself in social media.  First, I approach this question by examining whether a temporal 
relationship exists between controversial statements made by Donald Trump during the 
span of his presidential campaign and a resulting rise in affective rhetoric in the form of 
aggression, anxiety, or negativity in discussion about Donald Trump on Twitter.  Second, 
I examine whether or not these comments influenced social networks in a way that was 
more conducive to affective polarization, while also examining the extent to which these 
networks facilitated potential confrontation.  When combined, evidence of such 
relationships would help identify the existence of a Trump Effect in social media (or, 
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“Does it happen?”) while providing a measure of how deeply such an effect impacts civil 
discourse (or, “Does it matter?”). 
Research Design 
Research Questions  
 
Research Question #1: Do controversial comments by political elites affect 
social media discourse negatively? 
  
The first section of this chapter addresses the question: “Does it happen?”.  I 
explore this question by measuring whether a relationship exists between controversial 
statements made by Donald Trump during the span of his presidential campaign and a 
resulting rise in affective rhetoric in the form of aggression, anxiety, or negativity in 
discussion about Donald Trump on Twitter.  For my independent variables, I isolate 
especially controversial and insensitive remarks made by Donald Trump over the span of 
his primary and general election campaigns.  For my dependent variable, I use levels of 
aggression, anxiety, and negativity in tweets mentioning Donald Trump during this same 
time span.  Last, I use time series analysis to determine whether there is a relationship 
between Donald Trump’s comments and a resulting rise in affective rhetoric.   
 
Research Question #2: How do controversial comments by political elites in 
online spaces shape the network architectures that facilitate these discussions? 
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The second section of this chapter addresses the question: “Does it matter?”.  I 
explore this question by analyzing how networks of discussion behave on days where 
Donald Trump made especially controversial comments.  During these days, I conduct 
network metrics analyses to measure the size of communities of discussion and the 
relative efficiency of the networks within which these communities form.  These metrics 
provide evidence as to the relative levels of polarization within a given network at a 
given time.  If evidence of polarized communities exist, this would suggest a possible 
causal link between Donald Trump’s statements and polarized environments of 
discussion.  Further, I seek evidence of how these networks facilitate discussion of 
Donald Trump’s supporters as well as of his critics.   
 
Hypotheses 
  
Hypothesis 1: Controversial comments by Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential primary and general election caused a measurable increase in rates of 
anxiety, aggression, and negative affect on social media. 
Hypothesis 2: Controversial comments by Donald Trump involving during the 
2016 U.S. presidential primary and general election contributed to the creation of 
polarized and confrontational environments on social media. 
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Data and Methods 
Data Collection 
I test these hypotheses by using an original data set of several million tweets 
mentioning Donald Trump collected daily from 9/1/2015 through 3/1/2017 using the 
NodeXL template for Microsoft Excel (Social Media Research Foundation 2017).5  I use 
content analysis and network metrics to measure the extent to which levels of anxiety, 
aggression, and negative sentiment in tweets mentioning Donald Trump align temporally 
with controversial public comments he has made during his primary and general election 
campaigns.   
[Insert Table 1.1] 
 
Content Analysis 
As was the case in previous chapters, the primary tool for conducting content 
analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart 
Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill University.  This software was used in conjunction 
with the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Martindale 1975, 1990) and the Lexicoder 
Semantic Dictionary (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2016).  The Regressive Imagery 
Dictionary is comprised of approximately 3,000 words divided into three primary 
categories with 44 sub-categories.  These categories are divided into Primary Processes, 
which include drive, sensation, defensive symbolization, regressive cognition, and Icarian 
imagery; Secondary Processes, which include abstraction, social behavior, instrumental 
behavior, restraint, order, temporal references, and moral imperative; and Emotions, 
                                                
5 See Chapter 2 
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which include positive affect, anxiety, sadness, affection, aggression, expressive 
behavior, and glory.  The Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary draws upon a dictionary of 
approximately 5,000 words and is designed to measure the positive and negative 
sentiment in political texts.6  
[Insert Table 1.2] 
The full text for each day of observation from 9/1/2015 to 3/1/2017 was processed 
through Lexicoder 3.0 using both sentiment dictionaries, producing 548 individual data 
sets containing raw counts for anxiety, aggression, and negativity.  These raw counts 
were then converted into rates by dividing them into the total number of words tweeted 
during each day of observation.  In order to make these numbers more usable, they have 
been reported as “rate of anxiety per 1,000 words”, “rate of aggression per 1,000 words”, 
and “rate of negativity per 1,000 words”. 
 
Network Metrics Analysis 
 Several network metrics were utilized to measure for signs of relative polarization 
between networks.  First, I tested for average community size, as this measure provides 
an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are in the network.  
Generally speaking, networks with high average community sizes indicate a tendency of 
individuals in a particular network to cluster together around certain topics, themes, or 
pieces of information.  Second, I tested for average path length as a percentage of 
network diameter, as this measure provides evidence of a network’s efficiency and 
tendency towards homophily.  Generally speaking, networks featuring low relative 
                                                
6 See Chapter 2 
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average path lengths tend to be more efficient networks.  As a network’s average path 
length approaches its diameter, this indicates the network is becoming less efficient, as 
more “steps” are required for a message to reach one end of the network to the other.  For 
example, if a network had a diameter of 5 and an average path length of 5, this would 
mean that all messages in the network needed to pass through 5 steps in order to be 
shared.7 
 Last, I used network visualization techniques to provide an interactive and “big 
picture” view of how different messages propagate throughout different networks’ unique 
architectures.  This allowed for a unique look at how social networks react to extremely 
controversial comments made on the part of political elites by demonstrating how certain 
types of language, themes, or narratives propagated within the unique structures formed 
by a social network over a discrete time frame.  Most importantly, these techniques 
allowed for specific messages – such as those containing hashtags supportive (or critical) 
of Donald Trump – within the network to be highlighted so that their influence within the 
network could be assessed spatially.   
 
Findings 
“Does it happen?” 
 
Hypothesis 1: Controversial comments by Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential primary and general election caused an increase in rates of anxiety, 
aggression, and negative affect on social media. 
                                                
7 See Chapter 3 
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The first test of this hypothesis involved measuring how rates of anxiety, 
aggression, and negative affect increased and decreased over the 548-day span of 
observations.  The main goal of this first test was to obtain a contextual assessment of 
fluctuations in the communications environment to see if there were any identifiable 
patterns in tweet content and, more importantly, to see if these patterns aligned with any 
of the preselected controversial remarks. 
[Insert Graph 1.1] 
 Upon initial analysis, it was clear that there were significant increases and 
decreases in these types of language over time.  It was not initially as clear whether or not 
these increases and decreases aligned with specific comments made by Donald Trump.  
This was likely due to the wide span of observation combined with several significant 
spikes which created scaling issues that may have obscured some hidden effects.  For 
example, if the highest rate of anxiety measured was 14 per 1,000 words on one day, and 
the rates on all remaining 547 days were below 1 per 1,000 words, rate variations within 
those days would be hidden due to the predominance of a one-day spike.  This is 
especially important to consider, given such a spike could – and likely should – be 
viewed as an outlier.  As such, the time frame of observation was subdivided into four-
month periods in order to gain a clearer focus.  These subdivisions are reported in the 
following four graphs: 
[Insert Graph 1.2] 
[Insert Graph 1.3] 
[Insert Graph 1.4] 
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[Insert Graph 1.5] 
 Despite decreasing the time frame of observation into four-month periods, there 
were no clear patterns evident between any of the 20 pre-selected controversial remarks 
by Donald Trump and a resulting rise in aggression, anxiety, or negativity in tweets 
mentioning Donald Trump.  This is not to say that increases in such language on Twitter 
did not align with some of these comments by Donald Trump.  Levels of aggression rose 
following Donald Trump’s accusations that Hillary Clinton was playing the “woman 
card”, after tweeting “I love Hispanics!”, after his reference to “Second Amendment 
people” being able to do something about stopping Hillary Clinton’s election, after the 
release of the “Access Hollywood” tape, and after his claim that “millions of people 
voted illegally” in the election.  Similarly, levels of negativity rose following Donald 
Trump’s comments referencing Carly Fiorina’s face, him asking “How stupid are the 
people of Iowa?”, his claim that he could “shoot someone on 5th Avenue” and not drop in 
the polls, his failure to immediately disavow David Duke, his claim that “Islam hates us”, 
Hillary Clinton “playing the woman card”, comments following the Pulse Nightclub 
shooting in Orlando, and the release of the “Access Hollywood” tapes. 
 However, rates in aggression and negativity also dipped on other dates where 
Donald Trump made controversial remarks.  Further, there were significant spikes in 
aggression and negativity on dates where Donald Trump did not make especially 
controversial remarks.  This suggests that while there may be a causal link between 
Donald Trump and increases in aggression and negativity, such a relationship may not be 
driven by his controversial remarks – at least not in social media.  Thus, I did not find 
compelling evidence to either fully support or reject Hypothesis #1. 
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 While a Trump Effect may exist, it was not readily evident using this method of 
testing.  However, this could have been due to a number of flaws in the research design.  
For example, there may have been an error in selecting independent variables.  Given that 
there were spikes in affective rhetoric on certain days, this suggests that something was 
causing a reaction among Twitter users as they were discussing Donald Trump.  It is 
possible that there were other actions, comments, or interactions by Donald Trump which 
led to these reactions.  Given that Donald Trump made a large number of campaign 
speeches where a variety of extracurricular events occurred, it is possible that one of 
these events could have elicited negative reactions among Twitter users.   
 Further, it is possible that there were better choices for measuring the dependent 
variable.  While rates of aggression, anxiety, and negativity seem to fit the Southern 
Poverty Law Center’s notion of a Trump Effect, there could be other ways of performing 
content analysis that would be more effective in drawing such sentiments out of Tweets.  
For example, aggression, anxiety, and negativity do not necessarily equate to indicators 
of “bullying” behavior.  In sum, it is entirely possible that a more applicable and relevant 
content dictionary would lead to different results in the content analysis.  
 
“Does it matter?” 
 
Hypothesis 2: Controversial comments by Donald Trump involving during the 
2016 U.S. presidential primary and general election contributed to the creation of 
polarized and confrontational environments on social media. 
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 The time series analysis did not provide much evidence to support a Trump Effect 
on social media as defined by a temporal relationship between controversial comments 
and forms of mass affective rhetoric.  As previously noted, the content analysis portion of 
this study could very easily have used the wrong words for analysis and, in turn, may 
have missed evidence of a Trump Effect.  However, it is still possible that elite cues in 
the form of controversial comments have a polarizing effect on the networks in which 
discussion occurs.  Further, it is possible that the creation of such networks could 
facilitate confrontation more effectively than others.  If so, evidence of a type of Trump 
Effect may still exist.  For the second section of this analysis, I used network analysis 
metrics to gain a better understanding regarding the nature and structure of the discrete 
networks that form in response to controversial comments made by political elites and, 
more importantly, facilitate potentially deleterious sentiment in individuals’ responses.  
Additionally, I used hashtag analysis and network visualizations to examine the extent to 
which competing narratives clash in the wake of Donald Trump’s most controversial 
comments. 
 
Network Analysis 
[Insert Table 1.3] 
Just as it was necessary to limit the number of Donald Trump’s controversial 
statements for use in the time series analysis, it was also necessary to limit these 
statements even further in order to conduct a focused set of network analyses.  As such, I 
narrowed these statements down to six instances where Donald Trump’s controversial 
comments dealt with issues of gender, religion, race, and disabilities.  I selected Hillary 
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Clinton’s “alt-right speech” (8/25/2016) as a control measure to measure whether or not 
networks developed differently when Donald Trump made these controversial comments 
compared to when he was being attacked or criticized for making these comments. 
Unfortunately, I experienced corruption in my data set for the day when the 
Access Hollywood tape was released (12/7/2016).  As of the time of this writing, I was 
not yet able to repair the corrupted data so it was not able to be included in this study.  
Future research will include this data, as this comment created a major firestorm which 
nearly derailed Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and led to widespread protests 
following his election.   
[Insert Graph 2.1] 
 The first network test was designed to identify whether networks on certain days 
were more likely to facilitate confrontation than networks on other days.  This test used 
average path length as a proportion of network diameter as a measure of homophily, as 
this can be an indicator of polarized communities.  Such a measure is important, as 
discussion within polarized communities tends to be more homogenous in nature and, in 
turn, less confrontational.  This test also used average community size as a measure of 
cluster intensity.  Generally speaking, networks with higher average community sizes 
tend to have a larger number of people discussing similar issues or interests.  Whereas 
average path length as a proportion of network diameter suggests polarized communities, 
average community size suggests the intensity of this polarization. 
 It should be stressed that these measures are relative to each other and lose their 
descriptive power if read as absolute independent values.  Network analysis is often a 
process of comparison, where conclusions regarding the nature of one network gain 
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strength based upon the ability to compare that network’s characteristics with another 
network’s characteristics.  Using such a comparative approach when analyzing this first 
network test, a network with a comparatively high average path and average community 
size is more likely to facilitate highly populated polarized communities than a network 
with a comparatively low average path and average community size.  Likewise, a 
network with a comparatively low average path and high community size is more likely 
to facilitate highly populated connected communities, while a network with a 
comparatively high average path and low community size is more likely to facilitate 
diffuse and more sparsely inhabited communities.  
 This initial network analysis found that the control network on the day of Hillary 
Clinton’s “alt right speech” was the most connected (or least polarized) network 
containing the second highest population density per community.  These results suggest 
that a comparatively high amount of discussion between communities was occurring 
during Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”, and that these individual communities were 
more highly populated.   
 The network on the day of Donald Trump’s “millions of people voted illegally” 
comment was the second most connected (or least polarized) network containing the 
highest population density per community.  However, this network’s level of polarization 
was significantly higher than the network on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right 
speech”, placing it in the middle of the polarization pack with networks on the days of 
Donald Trump’s comments about a disabled reporter, his accusation that Hillary Clinton 
was playing the “woman card”, and his proposal for a temporary ban on Muslims.  These 
latter three networks also ranked comparatively lower in average community size which, 
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in turn, suggested lower community population density.  Last, networks that formed in 
the wake of Donald Trump’s comments stating “Islam hates us” and “I love Hispanics!” 
easily ranked as the most polarized networks with the 2nd and 3rd lowest community 
population densities; communities of discussion in these networks were far less 
concentrated and far less connected than the networks that formed on other days. 
 When analyzing these results within the context of the existence of a Trump 
Effect, questions arise as to whether network polarization can be a “good” thing as well 
as a “bad” thing.  For example, if the predominant language in a given network is 
inflammatory, aggressive, intemperate, or counterproductive to civil discourse, one could 
argue that network polarization would be a “good” thing; polarized networks are less 
connected and less efficient, thus moderating the effect of deleterious discourse.  
Conversely, tightly-knit (or less polarized) networks could be argued to be a “bad” thing, 
given the same conditions. 
Answering such questions requires an understanding that measures of network 
polarization only indicate the structure of the networks facilitating discussion.  They take 
on new meaning when we take into account the nature of the discussion occurring within 
these networks.  Content analysis performed while testing the first hypothesis found that 
rates of aggression in tweets (11.11 per 1,000 words) mentioning Donald Trump reached 
their highest point (out of 548 days) on the day which he claimed “millions voted 
illegally” in the election.  The second highest rate of aggression (10.92 per 1,000 words) 
was measured the day after these comments.   
Putting these rates in perspective, this meant that more than 1% of all words in 
tweets mentioning Donald Trump on these days could be categorized as aggressive.  
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These two rates were significantly higher than the 3rd highest rate of aggression (7.94 per 
1,000 words) and far higher than the average rate for all 548 days of observation (0.66 
per 1,000 words).  Given that the network on this date was relatively connected and 
populated by communities with relatively high population densities, it could be 
concluded that a lack of network polarization was somewhat of a “bad” thing.  The 
network was facilitating efficient communication between large communities and the 
discussion was notably aggressive.  Further, it provides compelling evidence that a form 
of a Trump Effect could, in fact, exist when observed in a network analysis frame of 
reference. 
Interestingly, the content analysis performed while testing the first hypothesis 
found that rates of negativity (5.44) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump reached their 8th 
highest value (out of 548 days) on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt-right speech”.  This 
rate was roughly twice as high as the average rate of negativity (2.64) for the entire 548 
days of observation.  As was the case with the network on the day of Donald Trump’s 
“millions voted illegally” comment, it could be concluded that a lack of network 
polarization was a “bad” thing, in that the network was efficient in facilitating negativity 
between large communities. 
The battery of network analyses strongly suggest that Donald Trump’s “millions 
voted illegally” comment created a network structure that efficiently spread aggression, 
while Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” created a network that efficiently spread 
negativity.  These results provide evidence of structural network preconditions for a type 
of Trump Effect to exist.  
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Hashtag Analysis and Network Visualizations 
 Given that evidence was found of networks that were capable of efficiently 
facilitating aggression and negativity, a final set of tests were conducted to approximate 
the individuals to whom these sentiments were directed.  Rather put, in order to 
determine the extent to which a Trump Effect exists, it was necessary to determine at 
whom this aggression and negativity was being directed.  To this end, I performed a 
hashtag analysis on tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the day of his “millions of 
immigrants voted illegally” comment and on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right 
speech”. 
[Insert Graph 2.2] 
[Insert Graph 2.3] 
[Insert Table 1.4] 
 The hashtag analysis for the network of tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the 
day he claimed “millions voted illegally” contained several hashtags that could be 
categorized as “pro Trump” and several that could be categorized as “anti Trump”.  The 
“pro Trump” hashtags were identified as #maga (115), #gop (41), and #tcot (34).  While 
it is true that there was significant resistance to Donald Trump amongst Republicans 
(#gop) and conservatives (#tcot, or “true conservatives on Twitter), given the context of 
the date for this network, I assumed that neither Republicans nor conservatives would 
more likely to support Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in a dispute over the results of 
the presidential election.  The “anti Trump” hashtags were identified as #recount2016 
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(85), #auditthevote (81), #amjoy (77), #recount16 (52), #notmypresident (43), 
#votersuppression (32), #imstillwithher (28), and #resisttrump (22).   
In the aggregate, “anti Trump” hashtags (420) far outnumbered “pro Trump” 
hashtags (190).  Further, this network featured by far the highest rate of aggression (11.11 
per 1,000 words) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump out of the 548 days of observation.  
Donald Trump’s claim that “millions voted illegally” in the election produced a great 
deal of aggression and, most importantly, this aggression was expressed in opposition to 
Donald Trump, rather than in support of Donald Trump.  This suggests that if a Trump 
Effect exists in social media, it does not exist in a form where it is aggression directed 
towards those who oppose Donald Trump, but rather it is aggression directed towards 
Donald Trump.  However, aggression in the aggregate does not necessarily mean this 
aggression was influential.  In order to determine the extent to which aggression 
contributed to a confrontational environment, I employed a second test using network 
visualizations. 
[Insert Graph 2.4] 
[Insert Graph 2.5] 
[Insert Graph 2.6] 
 For these visualizations, tweets with “pro Trump” hashtags were highlighted in 
red, while “anti Trump” hashtags were highlighted in blue.  As these visualizations 
demonstrate, “anti Trump” hashtags were much more successful at engaging the center of 
discussion far more frequently than “pro Trump” hashtags and, as such, were more 
influential.  In sum, “anti Trump” sentiment was more frequent, more aggressive, and 
more influential than “pro Trump” sentiment on the day Donald Trump alleged that 
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“millions voted illegally” in the election.  Rather than resulting in a Trump Effect where 
Donald Trump’s controversial comments fostered aggression among his supporters, it 
appears that these comments fostered aggression in his opponents. 
[Insert Graph 2.7] 
[Insert Graph 2.8] 
[Insert Table 1.5] 
 An identical pair of network tests were performed on the “control” network 
containing tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right 
speech”.  The “pro Trump” hashtags on this day were identified as #trump2016 (15), 
#makeamericagreatagain (14), #maga (13), #latinosfortrump (8), #trumptrain (8), 
#leadright (6), #tcot (6), #sickhillary (5), and #trumppence16 (5). The “anti Trump” 
hashtags were identified as #imwithher (31), #nevertrump (24), #toxictrump (21), 
#uniteblue (8), and #voteblue (6). 
 In the aggregate, “anti Trump” hashtags (90) slightly outnumbered “pro Trump” 
hashtags (75).  This network featured the 8th highest rate of negativity (5.44 per 1,000 
words) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump out of 548 days of observation.  Just as 
Donald Trump’s claim that “millions voted illegally” in the election produced a great 
deal of aggression, Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” produced a significant amount of 
negativity.  This negativity occurred in an atmosphere that was only slightly (20%) more 
“anti Trump” than “pro Trump”, rather than being decidedly more “anti Trump” as was 
the case following Donald Trump’s “millions voted illegally” comment.  However, 
negativity in the aggregate does not necessarily mean such sentiment was influential.  In 
order to determine the extent to which negativity contributed to a confrontational 
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environment, I employed an identical set of network visualizations to those performed on 
the network following Donald Trump’s “millions voted illegally” comment. 
[Insert Graph 2.9] 
[Insert Graph 2.10] 
[Insert Graph 2.11] 
For these visualizations, tweets with “pro Trump” hashtags were highlighted in 
red, while “anti Trump” hashtags were highlighted in blue.  These visualizations indicate 
that “anti Trump” hashtags were much more successful at engaging the center of 
discussion far more frequently than “pro Trump” hashtags and, as such, were more 
influential.  As was the case with the “millions voted illegally” network, “anti Trump” 
sentiment in the “alt right speech” network was more frequent, more negative, and more 
influential than “pro Trump” sentiment.  Rather than resulting in a Trump Effect where 
Donald Trump’s controversial comments fostered negativity among his supporters, it 
appears that these comments fostered negativity in his opponents. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
In sum, this chapter did not find compelling evidence to support the existence of a 
Trump Effect in social media.  After using time series analysis spanning 548 individual 
days of observation, the findings suggested controversial comments made by Donald 
Trump during this time frame did not align temporally with increases in aggression, 
anxiety, or negativity in the resulting Twitter discussion about Donald Trump.  When 
applying a network analysis approach, evidence was found of a phenomenon similar to 
the alleged Trump Effect; however, this evidence seemed to point more to a 
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“Clinton/Trump Effect”.  Rather put, the network analysis suggested that controversial 
comments and expressions of elite polarization do have the effect of inciting aggression 
and negativity in the general public.  As such, the findings provide compelling evidence 
of a causal link between elite polarization and mass affective polarization, which should 
provide for ample opportunities for future research.   
 Questions surrounding the existence of a “Trump Effect” are, at the very least, 
based in noble intentions and grounded in the goals of reducing incivility, anger, and 
resentment towards others that can lead to very negative real world consequences.  For 
example, we know that the problem of bullying in schools is a serious issue that often 
leads to a type of destruction to the innocence of youth which can have deep impacts on a 
child’s development, both immediately as well as into the future.  There is also evidence 
that adults are influenced by inflammatory rhetoric designed to target the lesser 
advantaged or the more vulnerable amongst us.  If it is true that our leaders are engaging 
in actions that lead to an increase in such predatory behavior, then it is incumbent upon 
our civil society to identify, condemn, and seek corrections to such actions.  
 At the same time, care must be taken to confirm such a causal relationship exists 
before even the first moral sanction begins.  The “Trump Effect” first gained notoriety 
following a survey conducted by an organization who openly admitted to its lack of 
scientific rigor.  This does not negate the good intentions of such an effort, nor does it 
diminish the need to question whether such an effect exists.  It does, however, highlight 
the need to maintain a pragmatic and scientific mindset when investigating questions with 
such important implications.  This is especially true considering discussions about and 
references to the “Trump Effect” often blurred the line between moral imperative and a 
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strategic political tool.  Maintaining a pragmatic and scientific mindset can indeed be a 
challenge when one attempts to maintain objective neutrality while analyzing aspects of 
one of the most contentious and nasty presidential elections in modern history.  
Regardless, this research has been conducted in manner that placed such an approach as 
the highest priority. 
 The goal of this chapter has been to test for a Trump Effect in a small slice of 
American society: discussions about Donald Trump on Twitter.  It should be stressed that 
this slice of American society was not representative of the broader American citizenry, 
nor were the behaviors engaged in this environment representative of the wide range of 
behaviors human beings in which human beings are capable of engaging.  Further, this 
research applied a unique mixed methods approach using empirical tests that may benefit 
from further methodological refinement.   
The findings presented in this chapter also raised the possibility that forms of 
mass polarization – whether ideological or affective in nature – may not always 
necessarily be a “bad” thing.  For example, in networks where there are high levels of 
aggression or negativity, perhaps it is more desirable for these discussions to be confined 
within clusters of likeminded individuals.  In such a scenario, the likelihood of open and 
aggressive confrontation with others is less likely, leaving misery to enjoy company.  
Such questions beg for additional research into some of the potential network effects 
highlighted in this chapter. 
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Table 1.1: Selections from Donald Trump’s Most Controversial Statements as 
Presidential Candidate and President Elect 
 
Date Comment 
9/9/15 Rolling Stone interview, Carly Fiorina’s face 
11/12/15 “How stupid are the people of Iowa?” 
11/24/15 Disabled Reporter 
12/7/15 Temporary Muslim Immigration Ban 
1/23/16 “I could shoot someone on 5th Avenue” 
2/6/16 Bring back things a “hell of a lot worse” than waterboarding 
2/28/16 David Duke 
3/3/16 Size of his “something else” (Rubio and hands spat) 
3/9/16 “I think Islam hates us.” 
4/28/16 Clinton playing the “woman card” 
5/3/16 Ted Cruz’s Dad and JFK Assassination 
5/5/16 “I love Hispanics!” 
6/12/16 
“appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic 
terrorism” 
7/2/16 The “star” tweet 
7/21/16 RNC Speech 
7/29/16 Khan 
8/9/16 “Second Amendment people” 
8/19/16 to black voters: “What do you have to lose?” 
8/25/16 Hillary's "alt-right" speech 
10/7/16 Access Hollywood tape 
11/28/16 Millions of people voted illegally 
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Table 1.2: Emotion and Secondary Process Categories, Regressive Imagery Dictionary 
 
 
 
Source: Provalis Research, https://provalisresearch.com/products/content-analysis-
software/wordstat-dictionary/regressive-imagery-dictionary/ 
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Graph 1.1: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump 
9/1/2015 – 3/1/2017 
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Graph 1.2: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump 
9/1/2015 – 12/31/2015 
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Graph 1.3: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump 
1/1/2016 – 4/30/2016 
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Graph 1.4: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump 
5/1/2016 – 8/31/2016 
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Graph 1.5: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump 
9/1/2016 – 12/31/2016 
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Table 1.3: Donald Trump’s Controversial Statements as Presidential Candidate and 
President Elect - Issues of gender, religion, race, and disabilities 
11/24/15 Disabled Reporter 
12/7/15 Temporary Muslim Immigration Ban 
3/9/16 “I think Islam hates us.” 
4/28/16 Clinton playing the “woman card” 
5/5/16 “I love Hispanics!” 
8/25/16 Hillary's "alt-right" speech (control measure) 
11/28/16 Millions of people voted illegally 
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Graph 2.1: Controversial Statements by Donald Trump involving Race, Gender, 
Religion, and Disabilities – Network Efficiency and Intensity 
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Graph 2.2: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 – 
“Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
 
Source: Twitter (11/28/2016)
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Graph 2.3: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 – 
“Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
Source: Twitter (11/28/2016)
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Table 1.4: “Pro Trump” and “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Tweets Mentioning Donald 
Trump on 11/28/2016 – “Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
"Pro Trump" "Anti Trump" 
#maga #recount2016 
#gop #auditthevote 
#tcot #recount16 
  #amjoy 
  #notmypresident 
  #votersuppression 
  #imstillwithher 
  #resisttrump 
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Graph 2.4: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 
– 
“Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq 
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Graph 2.5: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 
– 
“Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq 
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Graph 2.6: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 
– 
“Millions of people voted illegally” 
 
Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq 
 177 
Graph 2.7: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 – 
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
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Graph 2.8: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 – 
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
 
Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
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Table 1.5: “Pro Trump” and “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Tweets Mentioning Donald 
Trump on 8/25/2016 – Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
"Pro Trump" "Anti Trump" 
#trump2016 #imwithher 
#makeamericagreatagain #nevertrump 
#maga #toxictrump 
#latinosfortrump #uniteblue 
#trumptrain #voteblue 
#leadright   
#tcot   
#sickhillary   
#trumppence16   
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Graph 2.9: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 – 
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
Source: Twitter (8/25/2016) 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I
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Graph 2.10: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 
– Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
Source: Twitter (8/25/2016) 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I 
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Graph 2.11: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 
– Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” 
 
Source: Twitter (8/25/2016) 
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red 
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I 
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At the dawn of the Information Age in the early 1990’s, the Internet was viewed 
in largely utopian frames as a powerful new tool that would allow people to share and 
connect with each other in ways previously unimaginable.  This utopian perspective 
extended into the world of politics, where many believed the low cost and easy 
accessibility of the Internet would encourage people to engage in the democratic process 
more frequently.  Given the availability of such a powerful tool, it was also assumed that 
citizens worldwide would seize upon the opportunity to organize collectively to promote 
causes important to them, while also organizing dissent in order to hold their leaders 
responsible. 
 Perhaps the most visible example of such organized engagement by citizens was 
seen in the “Arab Spring” protests that spread throughout the Middle East and Northern 
Africa from late 2010 through early 2011.  It is difficult to deny the extent to which the 
Internet – and especially social media – provided citizens with the tools to organize 
massive protests that would likely have not been achievable otherwise.  The end results 
were visibly striking, with images of massive public protests in multiple town squares 
across several middle-eastern nations being broadcast around the clock on television sets 
and computer screens around the world.  To many, the ability for massive public 
demonstrations to rise from the grass-roots and demand democratization in the face of 
oppressive regimes was proof positive of the positive nature of social media. 
At the same time, the Arab Spring also had a far less publicized downside.  Just as 
social media equipped citizens with the power to organize coordinated opposition to 
ostensibly unjust regimes, social media also equipped these regimes with the power to 
identify, isolate, and retaliate against the political threats.  The Arab Spring provides a 
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powerful example of the dual nature of social media and how it can be used as a strategic 
tool for achieving political goals, whether those goals are perceived to be good or bad for 
democratic ideals such as egalitarianism or the right to free political speech.  
The dual nature of social media matters within the scope of democratic 
participation because it frames our understanding of affective rhetoric and the 
relationship between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media.  Social 
media can be used to organize public dissent or to share information regarding important 
policies, just as it can be used to target political threats or to spread false and misleading 
information.  Likewise, social media can be used as a vehicle for citizens to engage in 
rational and reasoned debate, just as it can be used to spread hatred, fear, anger, and 
aggression.  One could argue social media is a reflection of human nature.  However, 
rather than merely reflecting human nature, in many ways social media magnifies it.  
Such power is critical when considering the impact of social media on the democratic 
process, as this is a process that depends upon healthy participation. 
It is broadly accepted that polarization amongst the political elites in the United 
States is extremely pronounced.  The extent to which this has manifested itself in the 
form of mass polarization is less clear.  In part, this clarity has been elusive due to 
various possible causes of mass polarization, whether they be due to political elite cues, 
sorting, psychological impulses, or something else.  Regardless, mass polarization can be 
used by politicians in order to mobilize support and to win elections.  Unfortunately, 
when it is time for those politicians to transition into elected officials, the politics of fear 
and loathing become incompatible in an environment that requires negotiation and 
compromise (Kimball et al. 2013).   
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As social media continues to evolve as a platform for individuals to gather, 
process, share, and debate political issues, its potential for affecting mass polarization 
also grows.  Measuring how the frequency of potentially polarizing language on social 
media changes over time with relation to the occurrence of a political event is an 
important step in better understanding how elite cues influence mass polarization in 
different information environments.  More importantly, measuring how social networks 
treat polarizing language provides valuable insight into whether increases in such 
language will have a net negative effect on constructive debate, or whether it will be 
pushed to the fringes where its audience will be smaller and less influential.  
 
Future Research 
 This dissertation presents a number of opportunities for future research, both on 
the front end with data collection as well as the back end with hypothesis testing.  First, 
future research could employ notable improvements in the data collection process.  As 
noted in previous chapters, data for this dissertation was gathered using outdated 
computers and an almost-free alternative for gathering daily random samples of Twitter 
data within the last seven days.  With more robust funding, higher quality data could be 
obtained directly from the historical Twitter archives.  Such an option would allow 
researchers to search for specific terms within a clearly defined set of parameters, 
including specific time and date ranges, tweet volume per day, and so on.  In turn, this 
would lead to more consistent data sets for use in time-series analysis, rather than 
requiring research to be conducted on data sets consisting of random samples varying 
from 1,000 to 30,000 tweets per day.  Further, more robust funding would allow for 
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several more powerful computers, thus allowing researchers to conduct live-streaming of 
Twitter messages as they occur.  Such data collection methods were tested during the 
writing of this dissertation and provided rich and descriptive data sets that would be 
invaluable to creating more complete data sets for future research. 
Second, future research could build upon this dissertation by improving upon the 
classification of data, specifically in the area of content analysis.  While unsupervised 
content analysis provides a powerful tool for making sense of incredibly large amounts of 
data, it has some shortcomings in that it is dependent upon the quality of the content 
classification dictionary.  The first content classification dictionary used in this 
dissertation was the Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary, which is widely considered to be an 
accurate and dependable tool for measuring sentiment in political texts.  The second 
classification dictionary (the Regressive Imagery Dictionary) used in this dissertation was 
not quite as well-known or well-used in the social sciences, although it was valuable in 
identifying specific types of affect in messages, such as anger, aggression, and fear.  
However, a modified version of this dictionary specially tailored for analyzing political 
texts would likely provide more accurate results.  Further, future research could better 
define extremely uncivil language.  This dissertation selected the “F Word” as an 
example of extremely uncivil language, although this word can sometimes be used to 
express joy, excitement, anger, fear, or many other emotions.  Additionally, there are 
other extremely uncivil words that were not measured in this dissertation.  Again, this 
provides a number of opportunities for future researchers to create and refine an original 
content classification dictionary. 
 188 
Third, future research could build upon the explanatory power of the methodology 
employed in this dissertation by better identifying exactly what is happening inside the 
communities of discussion identified through network analysis.  While the methods used 
in this dissertation identified areas where polarization was more likely, more could be 
done with respect to determining whether or not the polarization was involving mostly 
positive or mostly negative types of discussion.  Further, more could be done in the area 
of identifying basic characteristics of the users involved in these discussions.  For 
example, future research could be conducted on measuring Twitter account data such as 
the account age, number of followers, number of people followed, whether or not the 
account has a profile picture, the types of websites the account tends to share, the users 
the account follows, and so on.  Such information would be invaluable for better 
describing the ideological leanings of users in the network, while also providing evidence 
of whether the user was a real person versus a bot.   
Last, the findings in this dissertation could be refined by future research into what 
their implications are in the real world, by questioning what happens outside of Twitter 
when people put down their phones or walk away from computers and decide to either 
participate politically – or not.  One way of potentially providing such answers could 
involve the use of a second wave survey of members of the networks, using a traditional 
question-and-answer format.  An immediate benefit of a second wave survey would be 
that it would instantly filter out bots.  A more valuable benefit would be that it would 
provide researchers with a clearer picture of how behavior in social networks (and, 
possibly, polarized social networks) translates into political participation.  Additionally, 
such data would be quite useful in describing differences in Twitter users when compared 
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to the broader population.  Perhaps most importantly, a second wave survey would allow 
the more novel approach of network analysis to be supplemented by more traditional (and 
better known) methodologies like regression analysis. 
 
Implications 
A sense of urgency is needed in developing a better understanding of human 
behavior in networked environments.  This urgency is warranted given the rapid pace at 
which everyday objects are being merged into networked environments.  Commonly 
referred to as the “Internet of Things”, this phenomenon raises a host of important 
questions with significant political implications regarding privacy, individual freedoms, 
and the proper role of government – not to mention the deeper philosophical questions 
regarding the ideal relationship between humans and technology.   
While estimates vary, the size of the Internet of Things is expected to grow from 
approximately 6 billion devices in 2016 to as many as 50 billion devices in 2020. 
Understandably, the worlds of technology and business are hard at work to ensure the 
Internet of Things is implemented in a manner that is timely, efficient, and profitable. At 
the same time, it is essential for social scientists to keep pace with these rapid 
developments, especially with respect to how the Internet of Things will undoubtedly 
impact the relationship between citizens, business, and government. These areas have 
serious normative implications in a democratic republic with citizens who expect 
openness, transparency, and responsiveness in their institutions, while simultaneously 
valuing freedom, privacy, and the power of participation.  Further, such rapid changes in 
humans’ relationships with technology begs new questions with respect to government’s 
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role in stimulating, moderating, and regulating these relationships in order to foster a 
civic culture that encourages participation, promotes responsible citizenship, and protects 
individuals’ privacy rights. 
 
Conclusions 
 Does elite polarization contribute to mass polarization in social media?  This 
dissertation has presented strong evidence of a causal relationship between the two.  First, 
there is a positive relationship between the temporal proximity to certain types of 
political events and a corresponding rise in affective rhetoric in social media, as well as a 
corresponding rise in certain types of extremely uncivil language.  This evidence was 
presented within the scope of the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary, and suggests 
that elite polarization expressed through affective rhetoric and other cues can elicit 
similar rises in affect among the mass public.  However, despite rises in affective rhetoric 
in the aggregate, social media networks exhibit the ability to isolate extremely 
unproductive language, thus limiting its reach and impact. 
 Second, there is positive relationship between specific types of emotional 
responses in the mass public when exposed to elite affective rhetoric.  This evidence was 
presented within the scope of a live broadcast of the first 2016 Presidential debate 
between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, and suggests that the types of emotional 
responses in the mass public (such as anger, aggression, or fear) are dependent upon the 
context of the elite cue (such as controversy, contempt, or confrontation).  This evidence 
is especially useful because it was obtained in a manner designed to capture the instant 
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effects of elite polarization on the mass public, thus providing a glimpse into people’s 
base reactions before they have had time to digest, contemplate, and reflect. 
 Third, this dissertation used an objective and scientific approach to test for the 
existence of a so-called “Trump Effect” in social media, as initially defined by an 
unscientific report by the Southern Poverty Law Center.  This purported phenomenon 
was widely reported in the media and on the presidential campaign trail as having 
contributed to a rise in aggression towards women, people with disabilities, and people in 
the racial, ethnic, and religious minority.  However, little evidence was found to support 
the claim that controversial comments made by Donald Trump during the primary and 
general election led to a corresponding rise in anger, aggression, fear, or anxiety in social 
media.  Interestingly, the most observable rises in such emotions corresponded with 
Hillary Clinton’s “Alt-Right” speech, which consisted primarily of strong criticisms 
towards Donald Trump and a segment of his supporters.  Not only did these findings shed 
doubt on the existence of a “Trump Effect” in social media, but they provided additional 
strong evidence of a link between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media.  
Specifically, high frequencies of affective rhetoric in Hillary Clinton’s “Alt Right” 
speech corresponded with notable increases in affective rhetoric on social media, thus 
creating an atmosphere more conducive to the growth of mass polarization. 
One central argument forwarded in this dissertation has been that the relationship 
between elite and mass polarization in social media cannot be measured effectively or 
accurately using the same set of tools that are used within traditional media.  Because of 
the significant differences between the traditional and social media environments, the 
nature of elite influence must be defined contextually when considering its power in 
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social media.  Simply put, elite cues are processed differently in social media than they 
are in traditional media sources.  Some expressions of affective rhetoric can be 
transmitted, processed, and disseminated within social media in a manner that has a far 
greater impact than it would have had through traditional sources.  Similarly, other 
expressions of affective rhetoric can be sequestered by social media networks through 
self-policing behavior that shuns extremely uncivil messages, thus blunting the reach and 
impact of otherwise high-volume messages. 
Rather, such questions must be answered in a way that accounts for the unique 
context of the media, lending credence to Marshall McLuhan’s 1964 observation that 
“the medium is the message”.  If it is true that the characteristics of the medium are just 
as important as the content delivered over the medium, one must take into account that 
the nature of the social media communications environment is structurally different than 
the traditional media environment.  In this respect, social media plays a part in modifying 
the relationship between political elites and the mass public, at the very least. 
Spiro Agnew once lamented that the state of media was being pervaded by 
“nattering nabobs of negativity”.  Saffire-crafted clever alliterations aside, there was 
wisdom in this warning.  Political elites – whether they are elected officials or members 
of the media – hold significant power when it comes to influencing mass beliefs.  
Affective rhetoric – whether it is positive or negative in nature – has an impact on 
shaping political discourse in the mass public.  Most importantly, the medium matters 
when seeking to determine the reach and impact of these cues.  Social scientists must use 
a set of tools appropriate to the type of communications medium being observed.   
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This dissertation has sought to measure the extent to which elite polarization 
influences mass polarization in social media by employing a unique mixed methods set of 
tools.  In doing so, the research presented herein has contributed to the political science 
literature by revealing a relationship between elite and mass polarization that would not 
have been observable using the traditional tools of social science.  However, the 
immediate utility of these findings does not represent this dissertation’s full contribution 
to political science.  Rather, the most durable contribution may be defined by the novel 
methodological approaches employed while addressing the main research question, as 
they provide a flexible blueprint for future researchers who seek to better understand how 
networked technologies shape human interactions. 
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